Day 5: Minimizing RBAC and ServiceAccounts
Goal: You find overly broad permissions, cut them back to what is needed, and give Pods an API token only when they need one – and then a short-lived one. · Duration: approx. 75 min · Prerequisite: Day 1
Briefing
CKS: Cluster Hardening (15 %) – “Use Role Based Access Controls to minimize exposure” and “Exercise caution in using service accounts e.g. disable defaults, minimize permissions on newly created ones”.
Role/RoleBindingapply within a namespace,ClusterRole/ClusterRoleBindingcluster-wide. A ClusterRole bound via a RoleBinding applies only in the binding’s namespace.- RBAC only knows permissions, no denials. Fewer permissions means: remove rules or bindings.
- Tool number one:
k auth can-i … --as=<user>or--as=system:serviceaccount:<ns>:<name>.
mkdir -p ~/cks/tag05 && cd ~/cks/tag05
k create ns tag05
k config set-context --current --namespace=tag05Drill 1: Find overly broad permissions
Recreate two typical mistakes: the CI pipeline
(deployer) got edit cluster-wide, the
monitoring (monitor) a wildcard role.
k create sa deployer
k create clusterrolebinding tag05-deployer --clusterrole=edit \
--serviceaccount=tag05:deployer
k create sa monitor
k apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: wild
rules:
- apiGroups: ["*"]
resources: ["*"]
verbs: ["*"]
EOF
k create rolebinding monitor-wild --role=wild --serviceaccount=tag05:monitor
k create secret generic app-key --from-literal=api-key=lab-key-123
k create secret generic db-pass --from-literal=password=lab-db-pw-123lab-key-123 and lab-db-pw-123 are lab
values only. Now ask from the point of view of the two accounts:
D=system:serviceaccount:tag05:deployer
M=system:serviceaccount:tag05:monitor
k auth can-i get secrets -A --as=$D
k auth can-i create deployments -n kube-system --as=$D
k auth can-i --list --as=$D | wc -l
k auth can-i --list --as=$M | head -2 | tr -s " "
k auth can-i create rolebindings --as=$M
k auth can-i get secrets -n kube-system --as=$MExpected:
yes
yes
98
Resources Non-Resource URLs Resource Names Verbs
*.* [] [] [*]
yes
no
deployer reads Secrets in all
namespaces and may deploy into kube-system.
monitor may do everything in tag05
(*.*), including granting roles – but nothing outside.
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Drill 2: Where do the permissions come from?
k get clusterrolebindings \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name} {.subjects[*].name}{"\n"}{end}' \
| grep tag05
k get clusterrolebinding tag05-deployer \
-o jsonpath='{.roleRef.kind}/{.roleRef.name}{"\n"}'
k get rolebindings -o wide
k get role wild -o jsonpath='{.rules}{"\n"}'Expected:
tag05-deployer deployer
ClusterRole/edit
NAME ROLE AGE USERS GROUPS SERVICEACCOUNTS
monitor-wild Role/wild 3s tag05/monitor
[{"apiGroups":["*"],"resources":["*"],"verbs":["*"]}]
ClusterRoleBindings do not show up in
k get rolebindings -A – always check both kinds.
k get clusterrolebindings -o wide shows the same, but is
very wide.
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Drill 3: The wildcard escalates
Play monitor with a real token. Watch out: with your
kubeconfig, kubectl still sends your admin certificate along, and that
wins:
k config view --raw \
-o jsonpath='{.clusters[0].cluster.certificate-authority-data}' | base64 -d > ca.crt
SA="--kubeconfig=/dev/null --server=https://172.16.0.126:6443"
SA="$SA --certificate-authority=ca.crt"
TOKEN=$(k create token monitor --duration=10m)
k --token=$TOKEN auth whoami | grep Username
k $SA --token=$TOKEN auth whoami | grep Username
k $SA --token=$TOKEN -n tag05 create rolebinding pwn --clusterrole=cluster-admin \
--serviceaccount=tag05:default
k auth can-i get secrets --as=system:serviceaccount:tag05:defaultExpected:
Username kubernetes-admin
Username system:serviceaccount:tag05:monitor
rolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/pwn created
yes
* includes the verbs bind and
escalate: monitor grants
cluster-admin to the default ServiceAccount, and with that
every Pod without its own account has full rights in the namespace.
Without these verbs, the API server refuses: “is attempting to grant
RBAC permissions not currently held”.
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Drill 4: ClusterRole via RoleBinding
monitor should only read, and only in
tag05. The built-in ClusterRole view fits –
bound via a RoleBinding:
k delete rolebinding pwn monitor-wild
k delete role wild
k create rolebinding monitor-view --clusterrole=view --serviceaccount=tag05:monitor
k auth can-i list pods --as=$M
k auth can-i list pods -n kube-system --as=$M
k auth can-i get secrets --as=$M
k auth can-i create rolebindings --as=$MExpected:
rolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io "pwn" deleted from tag05 namespace
rolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io "monitor-wild" deleted from tag05 namespace
role.rbac.authorization.k8s.io "wild" deleted from tag05 namespace
rolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/monitor-view created
yes
no
no
no
view deliberately leaves out Secrets. edit
and admin include them – that is why the permissions of
deployer were so dangerous.
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Drill 5: Least privilege for the pipeline
The pipeline only updates the image of existing Deployments in
tag05:
k delete clusterrolebinding tag05-deployer
k create role deploy-updater --verb=get,list,watch,patch,update --resource=deployments
k create rolebinding deployer --role=deploy-updater --serviceaccount=tag05:deployer
k auth can-i --list --as=$D | grep deployments | tr -s " "
k auth can-i patch deployments --as=$D
k auth can-i create deployments --as=$D
k auth can-i get secrets --as=$D
k auth can-i patch deployments -n kube-system --as=$DExpected (shortened):
deployments.apps [] [] [get list watch patch update]
yes
no
no
no
With --resource=deployments, kubectl sets the API group
apps on its own. Always also check what should
not work – “yes” alone proves no hardening.
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Drill 6: Secrets with resourceNames
notes-api needs exactly one Secret, app-key:
k create sa notes
k create role read-app-key --verb=get --resource=secrets --resource-name=app-key
k get role read-app-key -o jsonpath='{.rules}{"\n"}'
k create rolebinding notes-app-key --role=read-app-key --serviceaccount=tag05:notes
N=system:serviceaccount:tag05:notes
k auth can-i get secret/app-key --as=$N
k auth can-i get secret/db-pass --as=$N
k auth can-i list secrets --as=$NExpected (shortened):
[{"apiGroups":[""],"resourceNames":["app-key"],"resources":["secrets"],"verbs":["get"]}]
yes
no
no
list and watch return Secrets with
their content – whoever may list Secrets can read them all.
resourceNames cannot be applied to create (the
name is not yet known at creation time); a list of all
Secrets stays forbidden here.
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Drill 7: Default ServiceAccount and automount
A Pod without serviceAccountName gets
default – token included:
k run plain --image=busybox:1.37 -- sleep 3600
k wait --for=condition=Ready pod/plain
k get pod plain -o jsonpath='{.spec.serviceAccountName}{"\n"}'
k exec plain -- ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccountExpected (shortened):
default
ca.crt
namespace
token
Switch it off on the ServiceAccount (for all Pods that use it) and on the Pod (always wins):
k patch sa default -p '{"automountServiceAccountToken":false}'
k create sa web $do > web-sa.yaml
echo "automountServiceAccountToken: false" >> web-sa.yaml
k apply -f web-sa.yaml
k apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: web
spec:
serviceAccountName: web
containers:
- name: c
image: busybox:1.37
command: ["sleep", "3600"]
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: api-client
spec:
serviceAccountName: web
automountServiceAccountToken: true
containers:
- name: c
image: busybox:1.37
command: ["sleep", "3600"]
EOF
k run plain2 --image=busybox:1.37 -- sleep 3600
k wait --for=condition=Ready pod/web pod/api-client pod/plain2
k exec plain2 -- ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
k exec web -- ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
k exec api-client -- ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccountExpected (shortened):
ls: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount: No such file or directory
command terminated with exit code 1
ls: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount: No such file or directory
command terminated with exit code 1
ca.crt
namespace
token
On the ServiceAccount, automountServiceAccountToken sits
at the top level (next to metadata), on the Pod under
spec. Running Pods keep their token – plain
still has it; only a new Pod shows the effect.
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Drill 8: Short-lived tokens
k create token deployer --duration=1m
TOKEN=$(k create token deployer --duration=10m)
echo $TOKEN | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq '{sub, exp, iat}'
k get secrets -A --field-selector type=kubernetes.io/service-account-token
k create deployment web --image=nginx:1.29
k $SA --token=$TOKEN -n tag05 set image deploy/web nginx=nginx:1.29-alpine
k $SA --token=$TOKEN -n tag05 delete deploy webExpected (shortened):
error: failed to create token: TokenRequest.authentication.k8s.io "" is invalid:
spec.expirationSeconds: Invalid value: 60: may not specify a duration less than
10 minutes
{
"sub": "system:serviceaccount:tag05:deployer",
"exp": 1795023955,
"iat": 1795023355
}
No resources found
deployment.apps/web created
deployment.apps/web image updated
Error from server (Forbidden): deployments.apps "web" is forbidden: User
"system:serviceaccount:tag05:deployer" cannot delete resource "deployments" ...
exp - iat = 600: exactly 10 minutes, the minimum.
Without --duration, the token is valid for one hour. Such
tokens are not stored anywhere and expire on their own; there are no
long-lived Secrets of type service-account-token in the
cluster – do not create any either.
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Exercise: Speed Drills
- User
janemay read Pods intag05(get, list, watch), nothing else; also check another namespace. Target time: 1 min - ServiceAccount
batchwithout an automatically mounted token. Target time: 30 s - Create a token for
batchthat is valid for 2 hours. Target time: 15 s - Which ServiceAccounts in
tag05may read the Secretapp-key? Target time: 1 min
Solution
k create role pod-reader --verb=get,list,watch --resource=pods
k create rolebinding jane-pod-reader --role=pod-reader --user=jane
k auth can-i list pods --as=jane
k auth can-i list pods -n default --as=jane
k create sa batch
k patch sa batch -p '{"automountServiceAccountToken":false}'
k create token batch --duration=2h
for s in $(k get sa -o name | cut -d/ -f2); do
echo "$s $(k auth can-i get secret/app-key --as=system:serviceaccount:tag05:$s)"
doneExpected (shortened):
yes
no
serviceaccount/batch created
serviceaccount/batch patched
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs...
batch no
default no
deployer no
monitor no
notes yes
web no
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Checkpoint
k get clusterrolebindings \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name} {.subjects[*].name}{"\n"}{end}' \
| grep -c tag05Expected: 0
k auth can-i patch deployments --as=system:serviceaccount:tag05:deployerExpected: yes
k auth can-i get secrets --as=system:serviceaccount:tag05:deployerExpected: no
k auth can-i get secret/db-pass --as=system:serviceaccount:tag05:notesExpected: no
k get sa default -o jsonpath='{.automountServiceAccountToken}{"\n"}'Expected: false
Challenge
A colleague set something up “just for a moment”. Since then,
every ServiceAccount in tag05 – even a
brand-new one – may read Secrets in all namespaces. Find the cause and
remove it.
Preparation (plays the colleague):
k create clusterrole tag05-secret-reader --verb=get,list --resource=secrets
k create clusterrolebinding tag05-sa-secrets --clusterrole=tag05-secret-reader \
--group=system:serviceaccounts:tag05Hint: Bindings can point to a group instead of a ServiceAccount.
Solution
k create sa newbie
k auth can-i list secrets -n kube-system --as=system:serviceaccount:tag05:newbie
k get rolebindings -o wide | grep -c secret
k get clusterrolebindings \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name} {.subjects[*].name}{"\n"}{end}' \
| grep tag05
k get clusterrolebinding tag05-sa-secrets -o jsonpath='{.roleRef.name}{"\n"}'
k delete clusterrolebinding tag05-sa-secrets
k delete clusterrole tag05-secret-reader
k auth can-i list secrets -n kube-system --as=system:serviceaccount:tag05:newbieExpected (shortened):
yes
0
tag05-sa-secrets system:serviceaccounts:tag05
tag05-secret-reader
clusterrolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io "tag05-sa-secrets" deleted
clusterrole.rbac.authorization.k8s.io "tag05-secret-reader" deleted
no
Every ServiceAccount belongs to the groups
system:serviceaccounts and
system:serviceaccounts:<namespace>;
--as=system:serviceaccount:… includes them when checking.
Bindings to these groups (or to system:authenticated) are
especially broad.
Clean up:
k config set-context --current --namespace=default
k delete ns tag05Save your progress? Sign up for free
Exam Tip
- First
k auth can-i --list --as=…, then look for the binding – ClusterRoleBindings and RoleBindings. Moving an account from a ClusterRoleBinding into a RoleBinding is the most common minimization. - Imperative is faster:
k create role … --verb --resource --resource-name,k create rolebinding … --clusterrole|--role --serviceaccount=<ns>:<name>. Watch out: for a ServiceAccount always<namespace>:<name>. - Docs: kubernetes.io → Reference → Access Authn/Authz → “Using RBAC Authorization” and Tasks → “Configure Service Accounts for Pods”.
Enterprise Note
- Manage RBAC via GitOps and evaluate it regularly
(e.g.
kubectl who-canorrbac-toolplugins, policy engines like Kyverno against wildcards andcluster-admin). - People get permissions via groups from the identity provider (OIDC), not via individual certificates – certificates cannot be revoked.
automountServiceAccountToken: falseon thedefaultServiceAccount of every namespace as part of the namespace template; every app gets its own ServiceAccount.- External systems (CI, Vault) use short-lived, audience-bound tokens instead of long-lived token Secrets.
escalate,bindandimpersonateare as critical ascluster-adminitself.