Day 9: Pod Security Standards and SecurityContext
Goal: You enforce Pod Security Standards via namespace labels, read violations and make workloads
restricted-ready. · Duration: approx. 60 min · Prerequisite: Day 8
Briefing
- CKS: Minimize Microservice Vulnerabilities – “Use appropriate pod security standards”.
- Pod Security Admission (PSA) is built into the API server and active by default. It is controlled per namespace via labels – no webhook, no CRD.
- Three levels:
privileged(everything),baseline(no host access, noprivileged),restricted(additionally non-root,drop ALL, seccomp). - Three modes:
enforce(reject),warn(warning to the client),audit(note in the audit log, Day 15). Every mode has a-versionlabel.
pod-security.kubernetes.io/<mode>=<level>
pod-security.kubernetes.io/<mode>-version=v1.37 | latest
mode: enforce | warn | audit level: privileged | baseline | restricted
Preparation:
mkdir -p ~/cks/tag09 && cd ~/cks/tag09
k create ns tag09
k config set-context --current --namespace=tag09
curl -s http://172.16.0.126:30500/v2/notes-api/tags/listExpected:
{"name":"notes-api","tags":["1.0"]}
If the image is missing (the registry uses an emptyDir and forgets everything on restart), build it from the companion repo:
cd ~/cks
git clone https://github.com/thomaszachmann/cks-zum-anfassen
cd cks-zum-anfassen/notes-api
cat > Dockerfile <<'EOF'
FROM docker.io/library/golang:1.27-alpine AS build
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
ARG VERSION=dev
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -ldflags="-s -w -X main.version=${VERSION}" \
-o /out/notes-api .
FROM docker.io/library/alpine:3.23
COPY --from=build /out/notes-api /usr/local/bin/notes-api
USER 65532:65532
EXPOSE 8080
ENTRYPOINT ["notes-api"]
EOF
podman build -t 172.16.0.126:30500/notes-api:1.0 --build-arg VERSION=1.0 .
podman push --tls-verify=false 172.16.0.126:30500/notes-api:1.0
cd ~/cks/tag09Drill 1: The insecure starting point
A typical legacy setup: the app without any SecurityContext and a “debug Pod” with full access to the node.
k create secret generic notes-key --from-literal=NOTES_API_KEY=lab-key-123
k create deploy notes --image=172.16.0.126:30500/notes-api:1.0
k set env deploy/notes --from=secret/notes-key
cat > toolbox.yaml <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: toolbox
spec:
hostPID: true
containers:
- name: c
image: busybox:1.37
command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
securityContext:
privileged: true
EOF
k apply -f toolbox.yaml
k rollout status deploy/notes
k wait --for=condition=Ready pod/toolbox
k get pods
k exec toolbox -- ps -o pid,comm | head -3Expected:
NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE
notes-7d6b8b9c78-fd9c2 1/1 Running 0 19s
toolbox 1/1 Running 0 18s
PID COMMAND
1 systemd
2 kthreadd
PID 1 is the node’s systemd: with hostPID
the container sees (and with privileged influences) every
process on the host, including the kubelet and containerd. Without
labels, the namespace allows this – it behaves like
privileged.
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Drill 2: Warn first, then enforce
warn and audit block nothing. That way you
see what restricted would break before it hurts:
k label ns tag09 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn-version=v1.37 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit-version=v1.37
k run probe --image=busybox:1.37 -- sleep 1dExpected:
namespace/tag09 labeled
Warning: would violate PodSecurity "restricted:v1.37": allowPrivilegeEscalation != false
(container "probe" must set securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation=false),
unrestricted capabilities (container "probe" must set
securityContext.capabilities.drop=["ALL"]), runAsNonRoot != true (pod or container
"probe" must set securityContext.runAsNonRoot=true), seccompProfile (pod or container
"probe" must set securityContext.seccompProfile.type to "RuntimeDefault" or "Localhost")
pod/probe created
The warning is the checklist: every parenthesis names the field and
the required value. audit writes the same information as
the annotation pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit-violations
into the audit log – which is only switched on from Day 15.
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Drill 3: Check existing Pods with –dry-run=server
Before you set enforce, ask the API server which running
Pods would violate the new level:
k label --dry-run=server --overwrite ns tag09 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=v1.37
k label --dry-run=server --overwrite ns tag09 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=v1.37Expected:
Warning: existing pods in namespace "tag09" violate the new PodSecurity enforce level
"restricted:v1.37"
Warning: notes-7d6b8b9c78-fd9c2 (and 1 other pod): allowPrivilegeEscalation != false,
unrestricted capabilities, runAsNonRoot != true, seccompProfile
Warning: toolbox: host namespaces, privileged, allowPrivilegeEscalation != false,
unrestricted capabilities, runAsNonRoot != true, seccompProfile
namespace/tag09 labeled (server dry run)
Warning: existing pods in namespace "tag09" violate the new PodSecurity enforce level
"baseline:v1.37"
Warning: toolbox: host namespaces, privileged
namespace/tag09 labeled (server dry run)
baseline only bothers toolbox,
restricted all of them. The same for the whole cluster
(changes nothing, only a probe):
k label --dry-run=server --overwrite ns --all \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baselineExpected (shortened):
namespace/default labeled (server dry run)
Warning: existing pods in namespace "kube-system" violate the new PodSecurity enforce
level "baseline:latest"
Warning: cilium-kf854 (and 2 other pods): forbidden AppArmor profile, non-default
capabilities, host namespaces, hostPath volumes, hostPort, probe or lifecycle host,
privileged, seLinuxOptions, seccompProfile
Warning: etcd-cp1 (and 3 other pods): host namespaces, hostPath volumes, hostPort, probe
or lifecycle host
Warning: kube-proxy-7b5pz (and 2 other pods): host namespaces, hostPath volumes,
privileged
namespace/kube-system labeled (server dry run)
...
kube-system needs host access (CNI, kube-proxy, static
Pods) – there it stays privileged.
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Drill 4: Enforce baseline
k label --overwrite ns tag09 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=v1.37
k get pod toolbox
sed 's/name: toolbox/name: toolbox2/' toolbox.yaml | k apply -f -
k run hn --image=busybox:1.37 --overrides='{"spec":{"hostNetwork":true}}' -- sleep 1dExpected:
Warning: existing pods in namespace "tag09" violate the new PodSecurity enforce level
"baseline:v1.37"
Warning: toolbox: host namespaces, privileged
namespace/tag09 labeled
NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE
toolbox 1/1 Running 0 39s
Error from server (Forbidden): error when creating "STDIN": pods "toolbox2" is
forbidden: violates PodSecurity "baseline:v1.37": host namespaces (hostPID=true),
privileged (container "c" must not set securityContext.privileged=true)
Error from server (Forbidden): pods "hn" is forbidden: violates PodSecurity
"baseline:v1.37": host namespaces (hostNetwork=true)
Trap: PSA only checks at creation time. toolbox keeps
running – you have to remove it yourself. A hostPath volume
fails the same way with hostPath volumes (volume "…").
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Drill 5: restricted – Deployment there, Pods not
k create ns tag09-strict
k label ns tag09-strict \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=v1.37
k -n tag09-strict create secret generic notes-key \
--from-literal=NOTES_API_KEY=lab-key-123
k -n tag09-strict create deploy notes --image=172.16.0.126:30500/notes-api:1.0
k -n tag09-strict set env deploy/notes --from=secret/notes-key
k -n tag09-strict get deploy notes
k -n tag09-strict get events --field-selector reason=FailedCreate \
-o jsonpath='{.items[0].message}{"\n"}'Expected (shortened):
Warning: would violate PodSecurity "restricted:v1.37": allowPrivilegeEscalation != false
...
deployment.apps/notes created
NAME READY UP-TO-DATE AVAILABLE AGE
notes 0/1 0 0 3s
Error creating: pods "notes-7d6b8b9c78-wfvf8" is forbidden: violates PodSecurity
"restricted:v1.37": allowPrivilegeEscalation != false (container "notes-api" must set
securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation=false), ...
The Deployment itself is created (only a warning); only the
ReplicaSet controller fails at the Pod. In the exam, the symptom is “0/1
and no Pod” – the cause is in the events or in
k describe rs.
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Drill 6: Fix the violations
The four points from the warning, as a patch on the Pod template:
cat > fix.yaml <<'EOF'
spec:
template:
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: notes-api
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
EOF
k -n tag09-strict patch deploy notes --patch-file fix.yaml
k -n tag09-strict rollout status deploy/notes
k -n tag09-strict exec deploy/notes -- \
grep -E '^Uid|CapEff|NoNewPrivs|Seccomp:' /proc/1/status
k -n tag09-strict exec deploy/notes -- wget -qO- localhost:8080/healthzExpected:
deployment.apps/notes patched
deployment "notes" successfully rolled out
Uid: 65532 65532 65532 65532
CapEff: 0000000000000000
NoNewPrivs: 1
Seccomp: 2
ok
Every value is proven: non-root (65532), no capabilities,
no_new_privs, seccomp filter active. The strategic merge
patch merges the fields via the container name; by the way,
restricted does not require
readOnlyRootFilesystem (Day 18).
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Drill 7: runAsNonRoot – admission says yes, the kubelet says no
cat > shell.yaml <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: shell
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: c
image: busybox:1.37
command: ["sleep", "1d"]
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
EOF
k -n tag09-strict apply -f shell.yaml
k -n tag09-strict get pod shell -w # Ctrl+C once the error status shows
k -n tag09-strict describe pod shell | grep -m1 'Error:'Expected (shortened):
pod/shell created
NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE
shell 0/1 CreateContainerConfigError 0 7s
... Error: container has runAsNonRoot and image will run as root (pod:
"shell_tag09-strict(b26d…)", container: c)
PSA only checks whether runAsNonRoot: true is
set. Whether the image really starts as non-root is
noticed only by the kubelet. busybox has no USER – so
specify a numeric user:
k -n tag09-strict delete pod shell --now
sed -i 's/^ runAsNonRoot: true/&\n runAsUser: 1000/' shell.yaml
k -n tag09-strict apply -f shell.yaml
k -n tag09-strict wait --for=condition=Ready pod/shell
k -n tag09-strict exec shell -- idExpected:
pod/shell condition met
uid=1000 gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
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Drill 8: Find dangerous Pods in the cluster
Without PSA labels you have to search yourself. jq is
usually available in the exam; otherwise -o custom-columns
helps (Speed Drill 3):
k get pods -A -o json | jq -r '.items[]
| select(.spec.hostNetwork or .spec.hostPID or .spec.hostIPC)
| .metadata.namespace + "/" + .metadata.name'
k get pods -A -o json | jq -r '.items[]
| select(any(.spec.containers[], .spec.initContainers[]?;
.securityContext.privileged))
| .metadata.namespace + "/" + .metadata.name'
k get pods -A -o json | jq -r '.items[]
| select(any(.spec.volumes[]?; .hostPath))
| .metadata.namespace + "/" + .metadata.name'Expected (shortened, system Pods only – your
tag09 Pods are clean):
kube-system/cilium-envoy-7kl7t
kube-system/cilium-kf854
kube-system/etcd-cp1
kube-system/kube-proxy-7b5pz
...
kube-system/cilium-kf854
kube-system/kube-proxy-7b5pz
...
initContainers count too: with Cilium,
privileged is set only there. And where does PSA come from
in the first place?
sudo grep admission /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yamlExpected:
- --enable-admission-plugins=NodeRestriction
PodSecurity is not listed there because it is one of the
default plugins
(k -n kube-system exec kube-apiserver-cp1 -- kube-apiserver -h | grep enable-admission-plugins
lists them). Cluster-wide defaults and exemptions (namespaces, users,
RuntimeClasses) are set by an AdmissionConfiguration with
kind: PodSecurityConfiguration, included via
--admission-control-config-file. That is an API server
intervention like on Day 6 – here for your knowledge only, do not run
it.
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Exercise: Speed Drills
- Namespace
tag09-team: enforcebaseline, warn and auditrestricted, all versions pinned to v1.37. Target time: 1 min - Check which Pods in
tag09violaterestricted, without changing anything. Target time: 30 s - List all Pods in the cluster with
hostNetwork: true– withoutjq. Target time: 1 min - Pod
sleeper(busybox:1.37,sleep 1d) runs intag09-strict. Target time: 2 min
Solution
k create ns tag09-team
k label ns tag09-team \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=v1.37 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn-version=v1.37 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit-version=v1.37
k label --dry-run=server --overwrite ns tag09 \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted
k get pods -A -o custom-columns=\
NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,HOSTNET:.spec.hostNetwork | grep -E 'NS|true'
k run sleeper --image=busybox:1.37 $do -- sleep 1d > sleeper.yamlExtend sleeper.yaml (Pod and container level):
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: sleeper
image: busybox:1.37
args: ["sleep", "1d"]
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]k -n tag09-strict apply -f sleeper.yaml
k -n tag09-strict wait --for=condition=Ready pod/sleeperExpected (shortened):
namespace/tag09-team labeled
Warning: existing pods in namespace "tag09" violate the new PodSecurity enforce level
"restricted:v1.37"
Warning: notes-7d6b8b9c78-fd9c2: allowPrivilegeEscalation != false, unrestricted
capabilities, runAsNonRoot != true, seccompProfile
namespace/tag09 labeled (server dry run)
NS NAME HOSTNET
kube-system cilium-envoy-7kl7t true
...
pod/sleeper condition met
In task 2, restricted:v1.37 applies even though you do
not specify a version: the existing label
enforce-version=v1.37 stays in place.
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Checkpoint
k get ns -l pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restrictedExpected: tag09-strict is included.
k get ns tag09-strict \
-o jsonpath='{.metadata.labels.pod-security\.kubernetes\.io/enforce-version}{"\n"}'Expected: v1.37
k -n tag09-strict get deploy notesExpected: notes 1/1 1 1 …
k get pod toolboxExpected:
Error from server (NotFound): pods "toolbox" not found
Challenge
Install the legacy setup (below). Afterwards, namespace
tag09-ch should enforce restricted in version
v1.37 and the Deployment legacy should still run – without
the host network, without a host path, without
privileged.
k create ns tag09-ch
k -n tag09-ch create secret generic notes-key \
--from-literal=NOTES_API_KEY=lab-key-123
cat > legacy.yaml <<'EOF'
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: legacy
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
app: legacy
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: legacy
spec:
hostNetwork: true
containers:
- name: notes-api
image: 172.16.0.126:30500/notes-api:1.0
env:
- name: PORT
value: "18080"
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: notes-key
securityContext:
privileged: true
volumeMounts:
- name: logs
mountPath: /host-logs
volumes:
- name: logs
hostPath:
path: /var/log
EOF
k -n tag09-ch apply -f legacy.yamlHint: First get the list of violations with
--dry-run=server, then set the label – that does not remove
the running Pod; only the rollout counts.
Solution
k label --dry-run=server --overwrite ns tag09-ch \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=v1.37Expected:
Warning: existing pods in namespace "tag09-ch" violate the new PodSecurity enforce level
"restricted:v1.37"
Warning: legacy-6b55476555-2kbmg: host namespaces, privileged, allowPrivilegeEscalation
!= false, unrestricted capabilities, restricted volume types, runAsNonRoot != true,
seccompProfile
namespace/tag09-ch labeled (server dry run)
restricted volume types: only configMap, csi,
downwardAPI, emptyDir, ephemeral, persistentVolumeClaim, projected and
secret are allowed. Set the label, then in legacy.yaml
delete hostNetwork, privileged,
volumeMounts and volumes, and add the familiar
fields:
k label --overwrite ns tag09-ch \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=v1.37 spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: notes-api
image: 172.16.0.126:30500/notes-api:1.0
env:
- name: PORT
value: "18080"
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: notes-key
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]k -n tag09-ch apply -f legacy.yaml
k -n tag09-ch rollout status deploy/legacy
k label --dry-run=server --overwrite ns tag09-ch \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=latestExpected:
deployment.apps/legacy configured
deployment "legacy" successfully rolled out
namespace/tag09-ch labeled (server dry run)
No more warnings. Why enforce-version=latest as the
probe? If you set the same label with the same value, kubectl reports
not labeled and PSA checks nothing at all – the probe needs
a real change.
Clean up:
k config set-context --current --namespace=default
k delete ns tag09 tag09-strict tag09-team tag09-chSave your progress? Sign up for free
Exam Tip
- The API server rejects wrong values
(
must be one of privileged, baseline, restricted, versionmust be "latest" or "v1.x"). A typo in the key (…/enforcee), on the other hand, is accepted silently – check with--show-labelsafterwards. - After
enforce, old Pods keep running. If the task demands “no violating Pods”, recreate the Pods (k rollout restart) or delete them. - Docs: kubernetes.io → Concepts → Security → “Pod Security Standards” (field list per level) and Tasks → “Enforce Pod Security Standards with Namespace Labels”.
Enterprise Note
- Pin the version (
v1.37) so that a cluster upgrade does not block workloads overnight; before raising it, test with--dry-run=serverandwarnon the new version. - Cluster default
baselineenforce plusrestrictedwarn/audit viaAdmissionConfiguration, exemptions only for system namespaces. - Whoever may create or label namespaces can switch off PSA – keep
namespacespatchandupdatetight via RBAC (Day 5). - For finer-grained rules (allowed registries, mandatory labels), add Kyverno, Gatekeeper or ValidatingAdmissionPolicy.