Appendix A: Cheat Sheet
The most important audit and hardening commands from the book, by
topic. “Check as the attacker” means
--as=system:serviceaccount:<ns>:<name>.
RBAC (Days 1–4)
# Who am I / what am I allowed to do (from inside or via --as)
kubectl auth can-i --list --as=system:serviceaccount:<ns>:<sa> -n <ns>
# Who may read Secrets cluster-wide?
kubectl auth can-i list secrets --as=system:serviceaccount:<ns>:<sa> -A
# ServiceAccounts as subjects in ClusterRoleBindings (workloads with cluster-wide rights)
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json
for b in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"]:
for s in b.get("subjects") or []:
if s.get("kind")=="ServiceAccount":
print(b["metadata"]["name"],"->",b["roleRef"]["name"],
"(",s["namespace"]+"/"+s["name"],")")'
# Track down dangerous verbs: impersonate / escalate / bind / nodes-proxy
kubectl get clusterroles -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json
G={"impersonate","escalate","bind"}
for r in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"]:
for rule in r.get("rules") or []:
if G & set(rule.get("verbs") or []) or "nodes/proxy" in (rule.get("resources") or []):
print(r["metadata"]["name"], rule.get("resources"), rule.get("verbs"))'Hardening: minimal Role (namespaced) instead of
ClusterRole, use resourceNames,
automountServiceAccountToken: false as the default.
Pods & Nodes (Days 5–7)
# Privileged pods
kubectl get pods -A -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json
[print(p["metadata"]["namespace"]+"/"+p["metadata"]["name"]) for p in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"]
for c in p["spec"]["containers"] if (c.get("securityContext") or {}).get("privileged")]'
# hostPath / host namespaces
kubectl get pods -A -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json
for p in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"]:
s=p["spec"]; n=p["metadata"]["namespace"]+"/"+p["metadata"]["name"]
if any(v.get("hostPath") for v in s.get("volumes") or []): print("hostPath",n)
if s.get("hostPID") or s.get("hostNetwork") or s.get("hostIPC"): print("hostNS",n)'
# Enforce PSA
kubectl label namespace <ns> pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted --overwriteHardening: PSA default cluster-wide (baseline at
minimum, restricted where possible);
nodes/proxy for the system only; port 10250 reachable only
from the control plane via firewall/NetworkPolicy.
Network (Day 8)
# Default deny (ingress) per namespace
kubectl -n <ns> apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata: {name: default-deny-ingress, namespace: <ns>}
spec: {podSelector: {}, policyTypes: ["Ingress"]}
EOF
# Test reachability
kubectl -n <ns> exec <pod> -- nc -zv -w4 <ziel-svc> <port>Services & Secrets (Days 9–10)
# NodePort/LoadBalancer inventory
kubectl get svc -A --field-selector spec.type=NodePort
kubectl get svc -A -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json
[print(s["spec"]["type"], s["metadata"]["namespace"]+"/"+s["metadata"]["name"])
for s in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"] if s["spec"]["type"] in ("NodePort","LoadBalancer")]'
# Plaintext secrets in Deployment env
kubectl get deploy -A -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json
[print(d["metadata"]["namespace"]+"/"+d["metadata"]["name"], e["name"])
for d in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"]
for c in d["spec"]["template"]["spec"]["containers"] for e in (c.get("env") or [])
if "value" in e and any(x in e["name"].upper() for x in ("PASS","SECRET","KEY","TOKEN"))]'
# Encryption at rest (RKE2)
sudo rke2 secrets-encrypt statusHardening: secretKeyRef or mounted instead of plaintext
env; data services with auth; encryption at rest on.
Admission & Images (Days 11–14)
# Check Kyverno policies (mode Deny? scope?)
kubectl get validatingpolicy -o custom-columns=\
NAME:.metadata.name,ACTION:.spec.validationActions
# Version triage against a CVE
kubectl version -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json,re
v=json.load(sys.stdin)["serverVersion"]["gitVersion"]
maj,mi=map(int,re.match(r"v(\d+)\.(\d+)",v).groups())
print(v, "fixed>=1.22:", (maj,mi)>=(1,22))'Hardening: image guardrails (allowed registries, no
:latest, signatures), policies on Deny, scope
by excluding the system namespaces,
operations: [CREATE, UPDATE],
failurePolicy: Fail.
The golden rules
- Least privilege: roles as narrow as possible, no
cluster-adminfor workloads. - PSA default cluster-wide: no
privileged, nohostPath, no host namespace. - Default deny on the network, then open selectively.
- Secrets never in plaintext, encrypted at rest.
- Admission guardrails on
Deny, with no gaps in scope. - Patch – and additionally use policies as a protective wall against the next CVE.