Day 11: GitHub Actions
Goal: A GitHub workflow fetches secrets from OpenBao via OIDC, without a stored token, once with
hashicorp/vault-action, once withbaoandcurl. · Duration: approx. 90 min · Prerequisite: Day 10
Briefing
- With
permissions: id-token: write, a job may request an OIDC JWT from GitHub. The issuer ishttps://token.actions.githubusercontent.com. - The
subclaim depends on the context: environment beats branch, tag and pull request. hashicorp/vault-actionspeaks the Vault HTTP API (/v1/auth/<path>/login) and therefore also works against OpenBao.- Without the action, two HTTP calls do the job: get the JWT from GitHub, redeem it at OpenBao.
- A GitHub environment with reviewers is the approval. The role binds exactly this environment.
GitHub job ──(ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&audience=openbao)──▶ JWT
│
└── POST /v1/auth/jwt-github/login {role, jwt} ──▶ OpenBao ──▶ Token 5 min
Drill 1: Connecting the Real GitHub Issuer
OpenBao fetches the signing keys itself via OIDC discovery. For that, the OpenBao pod needs outbound HTTPS to GitHub.
mkdir -p ~/secrets-lab/tag11 && cd ~/secrets-lab/tag11
export BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200 BAO_TOKEN=root
bao auth enable -path=jwt-github jwt
bao write auth/jwt-github/config \
oidc_discovery_url=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
bound_issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
bao read -format=json auth/jwt-github/config \
| jq '.data | {oidc_discovery_url, bound_issuer, status}'Expected:
Success! Enabled jwt auth method at: jwt-github/
Success! Data written to: auth/jwt-github/config
{
"oidc_discovery_url": "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com",
"bound_issuer": "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com",
"status": "valid"
}
The counterpart on the GitHub side is one role per repo and environment:
bao write auth/jwt-github/role/shop-prod - <<'EOF'
{
"role_type": "jwt",
"user_claim": "sub",
"bound_audiences": ["openbao"],
"bound_subject": "repo:acme/shop:environment:production",
"bound_claims": {
"repository_id": "100001",
"workflow_ref": "acme/shop/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@refs/heads/main"
},
"claim_mappings": {"repository": "repository", "run_id": "run_id", "actor": "actor"},
"token_policies": ["ci-deploy"],
"token_ttl": "5m",
"token_max_ttl": "10m"
}
EOF
bao write auth/jwt-github/login role=shop-prod \
jwt="$(cd ../tag10 && ./mint-jwt.sh aud=openbao)" 2>&1 | tail -1Expected:
Success! Data written to: auth/jwt-github/role/shop-prod
* error validating token: error verifying token signature: failed to verify id token
signature
That is correct: your lab JWT is not signed by GitHub. From here on
you therefore replay the flow on jwt-ci/ with your lab
issuer from Day 10.
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Drill 2: Claims and sub Formats
The most important claims in the GitHub token (per the GitHub docs):
| Claim | Example | Bind for? |
|---|---|---|
sub |
repo:acme/shop:environment:production |
Job context |
repository / repository_id |
acme/shop / 100001 |
Repo; the ID survives renames |
ref, ref_type |
refs/heads/main, branch |
Branch or tag |
environment |
production |
only for jobs with environment: |
workflow_ref |
acme/shop/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@refs/heads/main |
Workflow file |
job_workflow_ref |
acme/ci/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@refs/heads/main |
Reusable workflow |
repository_owner |
acme |
Organization |
runner_environment |
github-hosted / self-hosted |
Runner type |
The sub formats:
repo:acme/shop:environment:production job with environment: (takes precedence)
repo:acme/shop:ref:refs/heads/main branch, without environment
repo:acme/shop:ref:refs/tags/v1.4.0 tag, without environment
repo:acme/shop:pull_request pull request, without environment
Warning: Repos created, renamed or transferred after July 15, 2026 (or by opt-in) get the immutable format
repo:acme@<owner-id>/shop@<repo-id>:…. Check the realsubof your organization before you setbound_subject. Withinclude_claim_keysyou can additionally customize the format.
By default, the audience is the owner’s URL
(https://github.com/acme). Set your own in the workflow,
here openbao, so that a token meant for AWS does not work
at OpenBao.
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Drill 3: Recreating Role shop-prod
in the Lab
The same role as in Drill 1, just on the lab mount:
cp ../tag10/{mint-jwt.sh,ci-issuer.key} .
bao write auth/jwt-ci/role/shop-prod - <<'EOF'
{
"role_type": "jwt",
"user_claim": "sub",
"bound_audiences": ["openbao"],
"bound_subject": "repo:acme/shop:environment:production",
"bound_claims": {
"repository_id": "100001",
"workflow_ref": "acme/shop/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@refs/heads/main"
},
"claim_mappings": {"repository": "repository", "run_id": "run_id", "actor": "actor"},
"token_policies": ["ci-deploy"],
"token_ttl": "5m",
"token_max_ttl": "10m"
}
EOF
PROD="sub=repo:acme/shop:environment:production environment=production"
for args in "$PROD" \
"sub=repo:acme/shop:pull_request event_name=pull_request" \
"$PROD workflow_ref=acme/shop/.github/workflows/evil.yml@refs/heads/feat"; do
BAO_TOKEN= bao write -field=token_policies auth/jwt-ci/login role=shop-prod \
jwt="$(./mint-jwt.sh $args)" 2>&1 | tail -1; echo
doneExpected:
Success! Data written to: auth/jwt-ci/role/shop-prod
[ci-deploy default]
* error validating token: invalid subject (sub) claim
* error validating claims: claim "workflow_ref" does not match any associated bound
claim values
Why workflow_ref? Without that binding, anyone allowed
to push a branch in acme/shop could write their own
workflow with environment: production. Only the environment
rule “only main” plus workflow_ref closes that
gap. If you call central reusable workflows, bind
job_workflow_ref instead of workflow_ref.
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Drill 4: Variant A –
hashicorp/vault-action
The workflow as it would live in acme/shop
(.github/workflows/deploy.yml). The action is currently at
major version v4 (Node 24 runtime).
mkdir -p .github/workflows
cat > .github/workflows/deploy.yml <<'EOF'
name: deploy
on:
push:
branches: [main]
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # no OIDC token without this
jobs:
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: production # sub = repo:acme/shop:environment:production
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: Secrets aus OpenBao
id: bao
uses: hashicorp/vault-action@v4
with:
url: https://openbao.example.com
method: jwt
path: jwt-github
role: shop-prod
jwtGithubAudience: openbao
secrets: |
secret/data/ci/deploy registry_password | REGISTRY_PASSWORD ;
secret/data/ci/deploy kubeconfig_token | KUBE_TOKEN
- name: Registry-Login
run: |
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login registry.example.com \
-u ci --password-stdin
EOFImportant: KV v2 needs the full API path with data/. The
action automatically masks every value it reads and exports it as an
environment variable (exportEnv: true is the default). Run
on GitHub, the log looks like this (abridged, may differ depending on
version):
Run hashicorp/vault-action@v4
Get Vault Secrets
✔ secret/data/ci/deploy => outputs.REGISTRY_PASSWORD | env.REGISTRY_PASSWORD
✔ secret/data/ci/deploy => outputs.KUBE_TOKEN | env.KUBE_TOKEN
Run echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login registry.example.com ...
Login Succeeded
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Drill 5: Testing the Action Locally Against OpenBao
The action is a single Node script. It reads its inputs from
INPUT_* and the OIDC token from
ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL. A small mock plays this
GitHub endpoint and signs with your lab issuer (requires Node.js 24 or
newer).
cat > fake-oidc.py <<'EOF'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Lab mock of the GitHub OIDC token endpoint (ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL).
Responds like GitHub with {"value": "<JWT>"}; signing is done by mint-jwt.sh (Day 10).
Additional claims come from the environment variable CLAIMS (e.g. "environment=prod").
Lab only!
"""
import json, os, subprocess, sys
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
BEARER = os.environ.get("REQUEST_TOKEN", "lab-request-token")
MINT = os.environ.get("MINT", "./mint-jwt.sh")
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
if self.headers.get("Authorization", "").lower() != f"bearer {BEARER}":
self.send_error(401, "bad request token")
return
query = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query)
aud = query.get("audience", ["https://github.com/acme"])[0]
args = [MINT, f"aud={aud}"] + os.environ.get("CLAIMS", "").split()
jwt = subprocess.run(args, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout
body = json.dumps({"value": jwt.strip()}).encode()
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
print(f"Token ausgestellt, aud={aud}", file=sys.stderr)
def log_message(self, *args):
pass
HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", int(os.environ.get("PORT", "8299"))), Handler).serve_forever()
EOF
CLAIMS="sub=repo:acme/shop:environment:production environment=production" \
python3 fake-oidc.py 2>fake-oidc.log &
export ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL="http://127.0.0.1:8299/token?api-version=2.0"
export ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN=lab-request-token
curl -sSfLo vault-action.js \
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hashicorp/vault-action/v4.0.0/dist/index.jsNow run the action with the same inputs as in the workflow, just against your lab:
: > gh-output; : > gh-env
env -u BAO_TOKEN GITHUB_OUTPUT=$PWD/gh-output GITHUB_ENV=$PWD/gh-env \
INPUT_URL=$BAO_ADDR INPUT_METHOD=jwt INPUT_PATH=jwt-ci INPUT_ROLE=shop-prod \
INPUT_JWTGITHUBAUDIENCE=openbao INPUT_EXPORTENV=true \
INPUT_SECRETS='secret/data/ci/deploy registry_password | REGISTRY_PASSWORD' \
node vault-action.js | cut -c1-80
echo "---"; grep -A1 '^REGISTRY_PASSWORD' gh-envExpected:
::group::Get Vault Secrets
::debug::ID token url is http://127.0.0.1:8299/token?api-version=2.0&audience=o
::add-mask::eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsImtpZCI6ImxhYi1jaS0xIn0.eyJpc3Mi
::debug::Retrieving Vault Token from v1/auth/jwt-ci/login endpoint
::debug::✔ Vault Token successfully retrieved
::group::Token Info
::debug::Operating under policies: ["ci-deploy","default"]
::debug::Token Metadata: {"actor":"zachmann","repository":"acme/shop","role":"sh
::endgroup::
::add-mask::s.1KuV01SfzTf0JvDvra05AIYD
::add-mask::lab-reg-pw
::debug::✔ secret/data/ci/deploy => outputs.REGISTRY_PASSWORD | env.REGISTRY_PAS
::endgroup::
---
REGISTRY_PASSWORD<<ghadelimiter_179d4f2a-2955-46d8-b6a8-71ceec142682
lab-reg-pw
You see the workflow commands in raw format: the action masks the
JWT, the OpenBao token and every secret value via
::add-mask:: before using it. The OpenBao token is not
revoked at the end; it expires after token_ttl. Hence the 5
minutes.
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Drill 6: Variant B – Fetching the Token Yourself
with curl and bao
No action, full control. This is the run step in the
workflow; here it runs against your mock. Otherwise GitHub sets the
variables itself.
cat > get-secrets.sh <<'EOF'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# GitHub Actions step: get the OIDC JWT, redeem it at OpenBao, read the secret
set -euo pipefail
JWT=$(curl -sSf -H "Authorization: bearer $ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN" \
"$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&audience=openbao" | jq -r .value)
echo "::add-mask::$JWT"
BAO_TOKEN=$(bao write -field=token "auth/$BAO_AUTH_PATH/login" \
role=shop-prod jwt="$JWT")
echo "::add-mask::$BAO_TOKEN"
export BAO_TOKEN
PW=$(bao kv get -field=registry_password secret/ci/deploy)
echo "::add-mask::$PW"
echo "REGISTRY_PASSWORD=$PW" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
bao token revoke -self >/dev/null
echo "✔ Secret übergeben, OpenBao-Token widerrufen"
EOF
chmod +x get-secrets.sh
: > gh-env
env -u BAO_TOKEN GITHUB_ENV=$PWD/gh-env BAO_AUTH_PATH=jwt-ci ./get-secrets.sh \
| cut -c1-60
cat gh-envExpected:
::add-mask::eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsImtpZCI6ImxhYi1j
::add-mask::s.7MIGoeu4CNYFfCRKtYn50XKW
::add-mask::lab-reg-pw
✔ Secret übergeben, OpenBao-Token widerrufen
REGISTRY_PASSWORD=lab-reg-pw
In the workflow, the installation of bao with a checksum
comes before it, and the usage after it (not executed):
cat > .github/workflows/deploy-cli.yml <<'EOF'
name: deploy-cli
on:
push:
branches: [main]
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
jobs:
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: production
env:
BAO_ADDR: https://openbao.example.com
BAO_AUTH_PATH: jwt-github
BAO_VERSION: 2.7.1
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: bao installieren
run: |
base=https://github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/download/v$BAO_VERSION
curl -sSfLO "$base/openbao_${BAO_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
curl -sSfLO "$base/checksums.txt"
sha256sum --ignore-missing -c checksums.txt
tar xzf "openbao_${BAO_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" bao
sudo install bao /usr/local/bin/bao
- name: Secrets holen
run: ./ci/get-secrets.sh
- name: Registry-Login
run: |
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login registry.example.com \
-u ci --password-stdin
EOFSecurity:
::add-mask::only takes effect from the line where it appears, and only for exactly this string. Never print values beforehand, noset -x, and mask derived forms (Base64, URL-encoded) separately.
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Drill 7: Environments as Protection
The environment production in GitHub gets “Required
reviewers” and “Deployment branches: main”. Only after approval does the
job start, and only then is there a token with
environment:production in the sub. Verify that
a job on main without an environment cannot get at
production secrets:
BAO_TOKEN= bao write auth/jwt-ci/login role=shop-prod \
jwt="$(./mint-jwt.sh)" 2>&1 | tail -1
pkill -f fake-oidc.pyExpected:
* error validating token: invalid subject (sub) claim
The sub is then
repo:acme/shop:ref:refs/heads/main. This makes the approval
in the GitHub environment the only door to the role
shop-prod.
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Checkpoint
cat > check.sh <<'EOF'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
cd ~/secrets-lab/tag11
export BAO_ADDR="${BAO_ADDR:-http://127.0.0.1:8200}"
login() { BAO_TOKEN= bao write -field=token auth/jwt-ci/login role=shop-prod \
jwt="$(./mint-jwt.sh "$@")" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
[ "$(BAO_TOKEN=root bao read -field=status auth/jwt-github/config)" = valid ] \
&& echo "✔ jwt-github per Discovery" || echo "✘ jwt-github-Config"
login sub=repo:acme/shop:environment:production && echo "✔ Environment-Login" \
|| echo "✘ Environment-Login"
login sub=repo:acme/shop:pull_request && echo "✘ PR kommt rein" \
|| echo "✔ PR abgewiesen"
login sub=repo:acme/shop:environment:production repository_id=999 \
&& echo "✘ fremde repository_id" || echo "✔ fremde repository_id abgewiesen"
grep -q 'id-token: write' .github/workflows/deploy.yml \
&& echo "✔ Workflow fordert id-token an" || echo "✘ permissions fehlt"
EOF
bash check.shExpected:
✔ jwt-github per Discovery
✔ Environment-Login
✔ PR abgewiesen
✔ fremde repository_id abgewiesen
✔ Workflow fordert id-token an
Challenge
Pull requests should run integration tests against a test database,
but only from the repo itself, never from forks. Create a role
shop-pr with the policy ci-test (read on
secret/data/ci/test) and test it with your lab issuer.
Hint: Bind event_name=pull_request.
pull_request_target runs with the permissions of the target
repo and must never get at secrets.
Solution
export BAO_TOKEN=root
bao kv put secret/ci/test db_password=lab-test-db >/dev/null
bao policy write ci-test - <<'HCL'
path "secret/data/ci/test" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
HCL
bao write auth/jwt-ci/role/shop-pr - <<'EOF'
{
"role_type": "jwt", "user_claim": "sub", "bound_audiences": ["openbao"],
"bound_subject": "repo:acme/shop:pull_request",
"bound_claims": {"repository_id": "100001", "event_name": "pull_request"},
"token_policies": ["ci-test"], "token_ttl": "10m"
}
EOF
PR="sub=repo:acme/shop:pull_request event_name=pull_request"
T=$(BAO_TOKEN= bao write -field=token auth/jwt-ci/login role=shop-pr \
jwt="$(./mint-jwt.sh $PR)")
BAO_TOKEN=$T bao kv get -field=db_password secret/ci/test; echo
BAO_TOKEN=$T bao kv get secret/ci/deploy 2>&1 | grep -m1 denied
BAO_TOKEN= bao write auth/jwt-ci/login role=shop-pr \
jwt="$(./mint-jwt.sh $PR event_name=pull_request_target)" 2>&1 | tail -1Expected:
lab-test-db
* permission denied
* error validating claims: claim "event_name" does not match any associated bound
claim values
Fork PRs run in the context of the target repo, so
repository does not help. The protection comes from GitHub:
fork PRs do not get id-token: write unless you explicitly
allow it in the repo settings.
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Enterprise Note
- GitHub-hosted runners come from the internet: OpenBao then needs a
publicly reachable endpoint (WAF, only
/v1/auth/jwt-github/loginand the required paths). Otherwise use self-hosted runners in the internal network and bindrunner_environment=self-hosted. - Pin actions by commit SHA
(
hashicorp/vault-action@<sha>), not by tag. The action sees all of the job’s secrets. - One contract per repo:
repository_id, environment,workflow_reforjob_workflow_ref. Never onlyrepository_ownerfor write or prod permissions. - Set a fixed
subformat org-wide viainclude_claim_keysand manage the matching roles as code (OpenTofu, Day 13). - Revoke the OpenBao token in the last step
(
bao token revoke -self), even on failures, viaif: always().