Skip to content
Hands-on IT IT Drills

Day 5: Transit and PKI

Goal: Have data encrypted without seeing the keys, and run a two-tier CA · Duration: approx. 120 min · Prerequisite: Day 2

Briefing

  • Transit = encryption as a service: the app sends data and gets ciphertext back. The key never leaves OpenBao.
  • Ciphertext carries the key version (vault:v2:...) – rotation without being forced to re-encrypt.
  • PKI = your own CA: the root in pki/, the intermediate in pki_int/ issues short-lived certificates.
pki/      Root CA (10 yrs)  --signs-->  pki_int/  Intermediate (5 yrs)
                                              |
                                  roles/webshop --issue--> api.webshop.lab (24 h)

Drill 1: Lab and Transit Key

Terminal 1:

bao server -dev -dev-root-token-id=root

Terminal 2:

mkdir -p ~/bao-lab/tag05 && cd ~/bao-lab/tag05
export BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200 BAO_TOKEN=root

bao secrets enable transit
bao write -f transit/keys/webshop

Expected (abridged):

Success! Enabled the transit secrets engine at: transit/
Key                       Value
---                       -----
deletion_allowed          false
exportable                false
keys                      map[1:1791442702]
latest_version            1
min_decryption_version    1
supports_encryption       true
type                      aes256-gcm96

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 2: Encrypt and Decrypt

Transit always expects plaintext base64-encoded.

CT=$(bao write -field=ciphertext transit/encrypt/webshop \
  plaintext=$(echo -n "4111-1111-1111-1111" | base64))
echo "$CT"

bao write -field=plaintext transit/decrypt/webshop ciphertext="$CT" | base64 -d; echo

Expected:

vault:v1:IUDSBoxEgTXXEZuDk2GyQP18X93vIy/bOlfgPVd2oSCXv1QHpUHnN6UZMRhW+U4=
4111-1111-1111-1111

Why vault:? The prefix has stayed for compatibility reasons; v1 is the key version.

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 3: Rotate, Rewrap, min_decryption_version

bao write -f transit/keys/webshop/rotate | grep -E 'latest_version|keys '
bao write transit/encrypt/webshop plaintext=$(echo -n "neu" | base64)

Expected (abridged):

keys                      map[1:1791442702 2:1791442708]
latest_version            2
ciphertext     vault:v2:xhgL7lQ+wTAdux7S+W2ZSgq3Pr2UCzKla+gLzvE=
key_version    2

Lift old data to the new version without seeing the plaintext:

CT2=$(bao write -field=ciphertext transit/rewrap/webshop ciphertext="$CT")
echo "$CT2"

Expected:

vault:v2:d7Ifgva7m99eJ5fpjKaHxLve3TMpwsUY+kpYQr2FVNbQ3f6Hvc9l2ThUmyGIT40=

Then lock out v1:

bao write transit/keys/webshop/config min_decryption_version=2 | grep min_dec
bao write transit/decrypt/webshop ciphertext="$CT"
bao write -field=plaintext transit/decrypt/webshop ciphertext="$CT2" | base64 -d; echo

Expected (abridged):

min_decryption_version    2
Code: 400. Errors:

* ciphertext or signature version is disallowed by policy (too old)
4111-1111-1111-1111

Warning: Rewrap all records first, then raise min_decryption_version – otherwise old data can no longer be read.

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 4: Datakey (Envelope Encryption)

For large files: OpenBao generates a data key, and you encrypt locally.

bao write -f transit/datakey/plaintext/webshop
bao write -f transit/datakey/wrapped/webshop

Expected (abridged):

Key            Value
---            -----
ciphertext     vault:v2:UE2bAO9UwGK/LW/Q8vqjrz1ET9mxdOeHPneil2P1JWtVU1x5...
key_version    2
plaintext      +innBfLQ2vB0gIpyWOlZmcZeBHNJi5tbBPCIT8/GPVQ=
Key            Value
---            -----
ciphertext     vault:v2:4+boJqiYRuC00vrTuCkpQMgT7vtv4griptB00hBVQOq7cCWALckh...
key_version    2

Why? You use plaintext immediately (AES-256) and discard it; you store ciphertext next to the file and later have it decrypted via transit/decrypt. wrapped returns only the ciphertext – for systems that decrypt later.

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 5: HMAC, Sign and Verify

HMAC (e.g. for pseudonymized search indexes):

IN=$(echo -n "[email protected]" | base64)
H=$(bao write -field=hmac transit/hmac/webshop input="$IN")
echo "$H"
bao write transit/verify/webshop input="$IN" hmac="$H"

Expected:

vault:v2:gF1nI5MRYrhjfJqJqT4YyGIZ0snC8P12ht4HSh5vXZU=
Key      Value
---      -----
valid    true

Signing needs an asymmetric key:

bao write transit/keys/webshop-sign type=ecdsa-p256 | grep -E '^type|supports_signing'

MSG=$(echo -n "Bestellung 4711: 99.90 EUR" | base64)
SIG=$(bao write -field=signature transit/sign/webshop-sign input="$MSG")
bao write transit/verify/webshop-sign input="$MSG" signature="$SIG"

FAKE=$(echo -n "Bestellung 4711: 0.01 EUR" | base64)
bao write transit/verify/webshop-sign input="$FAKE" signature="$SIG"

Expected (abridged):

supports_signing          true
type                      ecdsa-p256
valid    true
valid    false

Third parties may have the public key:

bao read -format=json transit/keys/webshop-sign | jq -r '.data.keys."1".public_key'

Expected:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEbxDKoRIXpSXVmCn+4e7vZ29CzpH5
...
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 6: exportable=false

bao read transit/export/encryption-key/webshop

Expected (abridged):

Code: 400. Errors:

* private key material is not exportable

Why? The default is exportable=false: nobody – not even root – can read out the key material. exportable=true can be set via transit/keys/<name>/config, but can never be reverted. Use it only for justified cases (e.g. migration).

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 7: Root CA

bao secrets enable pki
bao secrets tune -max-lease-ttl=87600h pki

bao write -field=certificate pki/root/generate/internal \
  common_name="Bao Lab Root CA" issuer_name=root-2026 ttl=87600h > root_ca.crt

openssl x509 -in root_ca.crt -noout -subject -issuer -dates

Expected (abridged):

Success! Enabled the pki secrets engine at: pki/
Success! Tuned the secrets engine at: pki/
WARNING! The following warnings were returned from OpenBao:

  * This mount hasn't configured any authority information access (AIA)
  fields; this may make it harder for systems to find missing certificates
  ...
subject=CN=Bao Lab Root CA
issuer=CN=Bao Lab Root CA
notBefore=Oct  8 06:58:11 2026 GMT
notAfter=Oct  5 06:58:41 2036 GMT

Why tune? The mount’s max_lease_ttl (default 32 days) limits every certificate, including the CA itself. The AIA warning goes to stderr; since v2.7.0, -field no longer suppresses warnings. You set the URLs next.

bao write pki/config/urls \
  issuing_certificates="$BAO_ADDR/v1/pki/ca" \
  crl_distribution_points="$BAO_ADDR/v1/pki/crl"

Expected (abridged):

crl_distribution_points          [http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/pki/crl]
issuing_certificates             [http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/pki/ca]

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 8: Intermediate CA

bao secrets enable -path=pki_int pki
bao secrets tune -max-lease-ttl=43800h pki_int
bao write pki_int/config/urls \
  issuing_certificates="$BAO_ADDR/v1/pki_int/ca" \
  crl_distribution_points="$BAO_ADDR/v1/pki_int/crl"

# 1. Generate the CSR in the intermediate (the key stays in pki_int/)
bao write -field=csr pki_int/intermediate/generate/internal \
  common_name="Bao Lab Intermediate CA" > pki_int.csr

# 2. The root signs the CSR
bao write -field=certificate pki/root/sign-intermediate \
  issuer_ref=root-2026 csr=@pki_int.csr ttl=43800h > int.crt
openssl x509 -in int.crt -noout -subject -issuer

# 3. Signed certificate back into the intermediate
bao write pki_int/intermediate/set-signed [email protected]

Expected (abridged):

subject=CN=Bao Lab Intermediate CA
issuer=CN=Bao Lab Root CA
Key                 Value
---                 -----
imported_issuers    [ce891cf4-62d6-829e-7a93-cb8375da1afa]
imported_keys       <nil>

Tip: Set the URLs before set-signed, otherwise OpenBao warns about missing AIA fields.

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 9: Role and Certificate

bao write pki_int/roles/webshop \
  allowed_domains=webshop.lab allow_subdomains=true max_ttl=72h

bao write -format=json pki_int/issue/webshop \
  common_name=api.webshop.lab ttl=24h > cert.json
jq -r '.data | keys[]' cert.json
jq -r .data.certificate cert.json > api.crt
jq -r .data.private_key cert.json > api.key

Expected:

ca_chain
certificate
expiration
issuing_ca
not_before
private_key
private_key_type
serial_number
openssl verify -CAfile root_ca.crt -untrusted int.crt api.crt
openssl x509 -in api.crt -noout -subject -issuer -enddate -ext subjectAltName

Expected:

api.crt: OK
subject=CN=api.webshop.lab
issuer=CN=Bao Lab Intermediate CA
notAfter=Oct  9 06:58:51 2026 GMT
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
    DNS:api.webshop.lab

Cross-check:

bao write pki_int/issue/webshop common_name=evil.example.com

Expected (abridged):

* common name evil.example.com not allowed by this role

Security: The private key is delivered only once and is not stored in OpenBao. cert.json and api.key are lab files – in production never leave them on disk.

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 10: Revoke, CRL and Tidy

SER=$(jq -r .data.serial_number cert.json)
bao write pki_int/revoke serial_number="$SER"
bao list pki_int/certs/revoked
curl -s "$BAO_ADDR/v1/pki_int/crl/pem" \
  | openssl crl -noout -text | grep -A1 "Serial Number"

Expected (abridged):

revocation_time_rfc3339    2026-10-08T06:58:56.468904Z
state                      revoked
Keys
----
15:53:13:bb:bf:54:6a:0e:89:75:9e:6c:3a:24:5e:47:d0:32:c4:1e
    Serial Number: 155313BBBF546A0E89759E6C3A245E47D032C41E
        Revocation Date: Oct  8 06:58:56 2026 GMT

Clean expired certificates out of storage:

bao write pki_int/tidy tidy_cert_store=true tidy_revoked_certs=true safety_buffer=1s
bao read pki_int/tidy-status | grep -E '^state|deleted_count'

Expected (abridged):

  * Tidy operation successfully started. Any information from the operation
  will be printed to OpenBao's server logs.
cert_store_deleted_count                 0
revoked_cert_deleted_count               0
state                                    Finished

Why 0? Tidy only deletes certificates that expired more than safety_buffer ago – our certificate is still valid for 24 h.

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Drill 11: ACME (Briefly)

OpenBao speaks ACME (RFC 8555) – certbot, cert-manager or Caddy fetch certificates directly.

bao write pki_int/config/cluster \
  path="$BAO_ADDR/v1/pki_int" aia_path="$BAO_ADDR/v1/pki_int"
bao secrets tune \
  -passthrough-request-headers=If-Modified-Since \
  -allowed-response-headers=Last-Modified \
  -allowed-response-headers=Location \
  -allowed-response-headers=Replay-Nonce \
  -allowed-response-headers=Link \
  pki_int
bao write pki_int/config/acme enabled=true | grep enabled
curl -s "$BAO_ADDR/v1/pki_int/acme/directory" | jq .

Expected (abridged):

enabled                     true
{
  "keyChange": "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/pki_int/acme/key-change",
  "meta": {
    "externalAccountRequired": false
  },
  "newAccount": "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/pki_int/acme/new-account",
  "newNonce": "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/pki_int/acme/new-nonce",
  "newOrder": "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/pki_int/acme/new-order",
  "revokeCert": "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/pki_int/acme/revoke-cert"
}

A real issuance needs a client and reachable challenges (HTTP-01/DNS-01) – that is not part of this lab.

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Checkpoint

#!/usr/bin/env bash
cd ~/bao-lab/tag05
check() { if eval "$2" >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "✔ $1"; else echo "✘ $1"; fi; }

check "Transit-Key webshop" "bao read transit/keys/webshop"
RT=$(bao write -field=ciphertext transit/encrypt/webshop \
  plaintext=$(echo -n ok | base64))
check "Encrypt/Decrypt Roundtrip" \
  "bao write -field=plaintext transit/decrypt/webshop ciphertext=$RT \
  | base64 -d | grep -qx ok"
check "Signing-Key ecdsa" \
  "bao read -field=type transit/keys/webshop-sign | grep -q ecdsa-p256"
check "Root-CA" "bao read pki/cert/ca"
check "Kette gültig" "openssl verify -CAfile root_ca.crt -untrusted int.crt api.crt"
check "Rolle webshop" "bao read pki_int/roles/webshop"
check "ACME-Directory" "curl -sf $BAO_ADDR/v1/pki_int/acme/directory"

Challenge

Create a policy webshop-encrypt that lets a token encrypt but not decrypt, and prove both.

Hint: Transit operations are update on the respective path.

Solution

bao policy write webshop-encrypt - <<'EOF'
path "transit/encrypt/webshop" {
  capabilities = ["update"]
}
EOF

T=$(bao token create -policy=webshop-encrypt -field=token)
CT=$(BAO_TOKEN=$T bao write -field=ciphertext transit/encrypt/webshop \
  plaintext=$(echo -n geheim | base64))
echo "$CT"
BAO_TOKEN=$T bao write transit/decrypt/webshop ciphertext="$CT"

Expected (abridged):

vault:v2:+TxsTcVYofyggN4t5B2b8GvsSrolm9gTpkP309Lnf3gCNA==
...
* permission denied

Save your progress? Sign up for free

Enterprise Note

  • Transit: set auto_rotate_period and run batch rewraps regularly; deletion_allowed stays false.
  • Split encrypt and decrypt permissions across different identities (writing service vs. reading service).
  • Do not run the root CA in the same cluster as the intermediate, or seal it off after signing; long root TTL, short leaf TTL (hours to days).
  • Automate tidy via config/auto-tidy, make the CRL/OCSP endpoints reachable for clients.
  • Open ACME only with eab_policy (External Account Binding) and restricted allowed_roles.