Day 8: SBOM, Scan, Signature, Provenance
Goal: Scan the image for vulnerabilities after the build, generate a bill of materials (SBOM), attach both together with a proof of origin to the image as attestations, sign it with cosign – and verify all of it on the VM. · Duration: approx. 90 min · Prerequisite: Day 7
Briefing
- Trivy scans an image for known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in packages and Go modules.
- An SBOM (software bill of materials) lists every component in the image. Syft generates it, e.g. in SPDX format.
- An attestation is a signed statement about an artifact: “this image was built by this workflow from this commit” (provenance) or “this is its SBOM”. GitHub signs it via Sigstore, without any keys of your own.
- cosign also signs images keylessly: the run’s OIDC token proves who signed.
- Everything refers to the digest
(
sha256:…), never to a tag – tags can move.
image ──digest──► absichern: trivy (CVE) ─► syft (SBOM) ─► attest SBOM
─► attest provenance ─► cosign sign
VM: gh attestation verify, cosign verify ◄── ghcr.io/<du>/notes-api@sha256:…
Drill 1: Passing on the digest and scanning
image.yml gets a second job. The first one passes on the
digest of the built image as an output:
cd ~/gha-lab/notes-actions
cat > .github/workflows/image.yml <<'EOF'
name: image
on:
push:
branches: [main]
tags: ['v*']
paths-ignore: ['**.md']
pull_request:
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
env:
IMAGE: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository_owner }}/notes-api
jobs:
image:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
outputs:
digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v4
- if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
uses: docker/login-action@v4
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- id: meta
uses: docker/metadata-action@v6
with:
images: ${{ env.IMAGE }}
tags: |
type=ref,event=branch
type=ref,event=pr
type=semver,pattern={{version}}
type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}}
type=sha
- id: build
uses: docker/build-push-action@v7
with:
context: .
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
push: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
build-args: |
VERSION=${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}
REVISION=${{ github.sha }}
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
absichern:
needs: image
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
id-token: write
attestations: write
env:
DIGEST: ${{ needs.image.outputs.digest }}
steps:
- uses: docker/login-action@v4
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Schwachstellen
uses: aquasecurity/[email protected]
with:
image-ref: ${{ env.IMAGE }}@${{ env.DIGEST }}
severity: HIGH,CRITICAL
ignore-unfixed: true
exit-code: "1"
EOF
git commit -qam "image: Digest weiterreichen, Trivy"
git push -qenv:at the top level applies to all jobs.${{ env.IMAGE }}substitutes it inwith:.outputs.digestpasses the digest fromsteps.buildto theabsichernjob. There it is available inenv.DIGEST; together withenv.IMAGEthat yields the immutable referenceghcr.io/<du>/notes-api@sha256:….permissions:in the job replaces the permissions from above completely.id-token: writeallows the job to request an OIDC token – Sigstore needs that.attestations: writeallows storing attestations at GitHub.- The job logs in to GHCR itself: every job runs on a fresh runner,
the login from
imagedoes not exist here. It is needed from Drill 2 on, when attestations go into the registry. exit-code: "1"turns the step red if Trivy finds anything fromHIGHup for which a fix already exists (ignore-unfixed).
With the ID from
gh run list --workflow image.yml --limit 1, as soon as the
run is finished:
gh run view <ID>Expected (shortened):
X main image · 41620540968
...
JOBS
✓ image in 1m13s (ID 125864812633)
X absichern in 13s (ID 125865407059)
✓ Set up job
X Schwachstellen
...
Red. What did Trivy find?
gh run view <ID> --log | grep -oE '│ golang.org/x/text .*' | cut -c1-80Expected:
│ golang.org/x/text │ CVE-2026-56851 │ HIGH │ fixed │ v0.29.0 │
The table is wider; cut -c1-80 cuts it off. In the full
log, the fixed version and a description follow:
gh run view <ID> --log | grep -oE 'CVE-2026-5685[0-9] .*' | cut -c1-90Expected:
CVE-2026-56851 │ HIGH │ fixed │ v0.29.0 │ 0.41.0 │ golang.org/...
CVE-2026-56852 │ │ │ │ 0.39.0 │ golang.org/...
- Trivy recognizes the Go binary in the image and reads the embedded
module versions – including indirect dependencies such as
golang.org/x/text. - Two vulnerabilities with severity
HIGH, statusfixed: there is a version without them. From 0.41.0 on, both are fixed.
Your list may look different – new CVEs are added every day. The solution is always the same: update the dependency. You don’t have Go on the VM; a container with Go is enough:
docker run --rm -u "$(id -u)" -e HOME=/tmp -v "$PWD":/src -w /src golang:1.27-alpine \
go get golang.org/x/[email protected]
git diff --statExpected (shortened):
go: upgraded golang.org/x/sync v0.17.0 => v0.22.0
go: upgraded golang.org/x/text v0.29.0 => v0.41.0
go.mod | 4 ++--
go.sum | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-e HOME=/tmp: As your user, the container has no writable home directory, but Go needs one for its cache.go gethas bumpedgolang.org/x/syncalong with it – the new version ofx/textrequires it.
git commit -qam "deps: golang.org/x/text 0.41.0"
git push -qWith the new ID, as soon as the run is finished:
gh run view <ID> --log | grep -E 'absichern.*│ notes-api'Expected (timestamp shortened):
absichern Schwachstellen ... │ notes-api │ gobinary │ 0 │ - │
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Drill 2: SBOM and SBOM attestation
You append new steps directly – absichern is the last
job in the file, and the indentation of six spaces makes them steps:
cat >> .github/workflows/image.yml <<'EOF'
- name: SBOM
uses: anchore/[email protected]
with:
image: ${{ env.IMAGE }}@${{ env.DIGEST }}
format: spdx-json
output-file: sbom.spdx.json
upload-release-assets: false
- name: SBOM-Attestation
uses: actions/attest@v4
with:
subject-name: ${{ env.IMAGE }}
subject-digest: ${{ env.DIGEST }}
sbom-path: sbom.spdx.json
push-to-registry: true
EOF
git commit -qam "image: SBOM"
git push -qsbom-actioncalls Syft and also uploads the SBOM as an artifact.upload-release-assets: false: On a tag push, the action would otherwise also attach the SBOM to the release – the job lackscontents: writefor that, and the step fails withResource not accessible by integration.actions/attestwithsbom-pathsigns the SBOM and, withpush-to-registry, puts it next to the image in the registry. Whoever has the image also finds its bill of materials.
As soon as the run is finished:
gh run view <ID>Expected (shortened):
JOBS
✓ image in 1m2s (ID 125874935333)
✓ absichern in 23s (ID 125875422164)
ARTIFACTS
<du>~notes-actions~Q3IEUP.dockerbuild
<du>-notes-api_sha256_7145981e51f8728e420640328602a355f0859a61f05ffa821e79b...spdx.json
- The second artifact is the SBOM, named after image and digest.
- The first one is created by
build-push-actionon its own: an export of the build that Docker Desktop can open as a build report.
gh run download <ID> -p '*.spdx.json' -D /tmp/sbom
jq -r '.packages[].name' /tmp/sbom/*/*.json | sort | headExpected (shortened):
example.com/notes-api
ghcr.io/<du>/notes-api
github.com/google/uuid
github.com/jackc/pgpassfile
github.com/jackc/pgservicefile
github.com/jackc/pgx/v5
github.com/jackc/puddle/v2
golang.org/x/sync
golang.org/x/text
stdlib
The image itself, notes-api as a Go module, the modules from
go.mod and stdlib – the Go standard library in
the version it was built with.
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Drill 3: Provenance
cat >> .github/workflows/image.yml <<'EOF'
- name: Provenance
uses: actions/attest@v4
with:
subject-name: ${{ env.IMAGE }}
subject-digest: ${{ env.DIGEST }}
push-to-registry: true
EOF
git commit -qam "image: Provenance"
git push -qThe same action, this time without sbom-path: then
actions/attest generates an SLSA provenance. It records:
which repository, which workflow, which commit, which runner. Verify it
on the VM as soon as the run is finished:
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/<du>/notes-api:main -R <du>/notes-actionsExpected (shortened):
Loaded digest sha256:34516f7eafc7179c857bbf4c81c6a7eeb60475626d4af93101...... for ...
Loaded 1 attestation from GitHub API
The following policy criteria will be enforced:
- Predicate type must match:................ https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1
- Source Repository Owner URI must match:... https://github.com/<du>
- Source Repository URI must match:......... https://github.com/<du>/notes-actions
- Subject Alternative Name must match regex: (?i)^https://github\.com/<du>/notes-act...
- OIDC Issuer must match:................... https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
✓ Verification succeeded!
The following 1 attestation matched the policy criteria
- Attestation #1
- Build repo:..... <du>/notes-actions
- Build workflow:. .github/workflows/image.yml@refs/heads/main
- Signer repo:.... <du>/notes-actions
- Signer workflow: .github/workflows/image.yml@refs/heads/main
ghfetches the attestations for the digest behind:mainand checks them against a policy.-Rspecifies: it must come from this repository. An image that someone else built and uploaded under your name fails.- Without further options,
ghchecks the provenance (slsa.dev/provenance/v1). The SBOM attestation is attached to the same digest; the checkpoint checks it specifically.
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Drill 4: Signing with cosign
cat >> .github/workflows/image.yml <<'EOF'
- uses: sigstore/[email protected]
- name: Signieren
run: cosign sign --yes "$IMAGE@$DIGEST"
EOF
git commit -qam "image: cosign"
git push -qcosign signwithout a key fetches an OIDC token of the run, has Sigstore issue a short-lived certificate for it and signs with that.--yesconfirms that the signature is entered into the public transparency log Rekor."$IMAGE@$DIGEST"instead of${{ … }}: inrun:, the shell reads the variables – safer, as Day 9 shows.
cosign on the VM:
mkdir -p ~/.local/bin
gh release download v3.1.4 -R sigstore/cosign -p cosign-linux-amd64 \
-O ~/.local/bin/cosign
chmod +x ~/.local/bin/cosign
cosign version | grep GitVersionExpected:
GitVersion: v3.1.4
On Ubuntu, ~/.local/bin is in the PATH as
soon as it exists – after creating it for the first time, log out and
back in once.
As soon as the run is finished:
cosign verify ghcr.io/<du>/notes-api:main \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/<du>/notes-actions/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com >/dev/nullExpected:
Verification for ghcr.io/<du>/notes-api:main --
The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
- The cosign claims were validated
- Existence of the claims in the transparency log was verified offline
- The code-signing certificate was verified using trusted certificate authority ...
cosign writes the result of the verification to stderr
and the signatures as JSON to stdout; >/dev/null hides
the JSON. If the verification fails, cosign ends with
Error: no matching signatures.
--certificate-identity-regexp: Who must have signed? A workflow from your repository.--certificate-oidc-issuer: Who confirmed this identity? The OIDC service of GitHub Actions.- Both together are the policy. A signature without this check proves nothing.
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Checkpoint
gh run view <ID> --json jobs --jq '.jobs[] | .name + " " + .conclusion'Expected:
image success
absichern success
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/<du>/notes-api:main -R <du>/notes-actions \
--predicate-type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 >/dev/null; echo "Exit: $?"Expected:
Exit: 0
--predicate-type specifically checks the SBOM
attestation.
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/<du>/notes-api:main -R octocat/hello-world \
>/dev/null 2>&1; echo "Exit: $?"Expected:
Exit: 1
There is no attestation for this image from a foreign repository.
Challenge
Trivy should additionally store its findings in GitHub’s code scanning so that they appear under Security – without turning the run red.
Hint: A second Trivy step with
format: sarif, output: trivy.sarif and
exit-code: "0", followed by
github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4. The job needs
security-events: write.
Solution
permissions: sits in the middle of the job. Use the
editor (nano or vim) to insert a line below
attestations: write:
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
id-token: write
attestations: write
security-events: write
Then append the steps:
cat >> .github/workflows/image.yml <<'EOF'
- name: Schwachstellen als SARIF
uses: aquasecurity/[email protected]
with:
image-ref: ${{ env.IMAGE }}@${{ env.DIGEST }}
format: sarif
output: trivy.sarif
exit-code: "0"
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
with:
sarif_file: trivy.sarif
EOF
git commit -qam "image: Trivy-Funde nach Code scanning"
git push -qAs soon as the run is finished:
gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/code-scanning/analyses \
--jq '.[0] | .tool.name, .results_count'Expected (the number may differ):
Trivy
0
Zero findings in the image. With format: sarif, Trivy
reports all severities, not just HIGH. Findings appear
under Security → Code scanning.
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Enterprise Note
- Verify at deployment: A signature is only useful if someone verifies it. In Kubernetes, admission controllers such as Kyverno or the Sigstore Policy Controller take care of that: images without a matching signature or provenance are rejected.
- SLSA: GitHub’s provenance meets SLSA Build Level 2, with reusable workflows (Day 12) Level 3 – the build then runs in a workflow that the calling repository cannot change.
- Private repositories: Attestations there require GitHub Enterprise Cloud. They do not end up in the public Rekor log.
- Noise: Trivy with
exit-code: 1withoutignore-unfixedblocks builds because of vulnerabilities for which no fix exists. A.trivyignorewith a justification and an expiry date is better than a disabled scan.