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Hands-on IT IT Drills

Day 11: Arbitrary Images and the Supply Chain

Goal: You block images from foreign registries and :latest with a Kyverno ValidatingPolicy. · Duration: approx. 70 min · Prerequisite: Kyverno installed

Briefing

A cluster that starts any image from anywhere trusts half the world: a typosquatted kubectl image, a backdoored base image, a :latest that changes unnoticed. The defense is admission – a webhook that checks every Pod before it starts. We use Kyverno. Note: from version 1.20 on, Kyverno only runs the new CEL-based types; the old ClusterPolicy has been removed. So we write a ValidatingPolicy.

Prerequisite: Kyverno is installed (helm install kyverno kyverno/kyverno -n kyverno --create-namespace). Check: kubectl -n kyverno get pods – four controllers are running.

Drill 1: The open state – everything runs

kubectl create namespace supply
kubectl -n supply run bad --image=busybox:latest --command -- sleep infinity
kubectl -n supply get pod bad -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}'; echo
kubectl -n supply delete pod bad

Expected: Pending/Running – the Pod is accepted. :latest from an arbitrary registry, no questions asked.

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Drill 2: The guardrail – ValidatingPolicy

Two rules in CEL: no :latest/missing tag, and only allowed registries. Scope via a matchCondition on the namespace:

kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1
kind: ValidatingPolicy
metadata:
  name: image-guardrails
spec:
  validationActions: ["Deny"]
  matchConstraints:
    resourceRules:
    - apiGroups: [""]
      apiVersions: ["v1"]
      operations: ["CREATE","UPDATE"]
      resources: ["pods"]
  matchConditions:
  - name: only-supply
    expression: "request.namespace == 'supply'"
  validations:
  - expression: >-
      object.spec.containers.all(c,
        !c.image.endsWith(':latest') && (c.image.contains(':') || c.image.contains('@')))
    message: ":latest oder fehlendes Tag ist verboten – nutze ein festes Tag oder Digest"
  - expression: >-
      object.spec.containers.all(c,
        c.image.startsWith('docker.io/library/') || c.image.startsWith('registry.k8s.io/'))
    message: "nur Images von docker.io/library oder registry.k8s.io erlaubt"
EOF

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Drill 3: Proof – the dangerous images are rejected

:latest:

kubectl -n supply run bad --image=docker.io/library/busybox:latest --command -- sleep infinity

Expected:

Error from server: admission webhook "vpol.validate.kyverno.svc-...-image-guardrails"
denied the request: Policy image-guardrails failed: :latest oder fehlendes Tag ist
verboten – nutze ein festes Tag oder Digest

A foreign registry (here a fictional “backdoor” image):

kubectl -n supply run eve --image=ghcr.io/evil/backdoor:1.0 --command -- sleep infinity

Expected:

Error from server: admission webhook "..." denied the request: Policy image-guardrails
failed: nur Images von docker.io/library oder registry.k8s.io erlaubt

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Drill 4: Proof – the allowed image runs

kubectl -n supply run good --image=docker.io/library/busybox:1.36 --command -- sleep infinity
kubectl -n supply wait --for=condition=Ready pod/good --timeout=60s

Expected:

pod/good condition met

The guardrail does not block across the board – it lets exactly what is allowed through. Clean up:

kubectl delete validatingpolicy image-guardrails
kubectl delete namespace supply

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Checkpoint

After re-creating the policy and the namespace, the webhook rejects :latest:

kubectl create namespace supply
# re-apply the policy from Drill 2, then:
kubectl -n supply run t --image=docker.io/library/busybox:latest --command -- sleep infinity \
  2>&1 | grep -o "Policy image-guardrails failed: :latest.*Digest"
kubectl delete namespace supply; kubectl delete validatingpolicy image-guardrails

Expected (excerpt): Policy image-guardrails failed: :latest ... Digest

Challenge

A registry allowlist and a :latest ban stop sloppiness and obviously foreign images. But an attacker could tamper with an image under your allowed name. The hard solution is signature verification: Kyverno’s ImageValidatingPolicy verifies cosign signatures and admits only signed images. Sketch which fields such a policy needs.

Hint: kubectl explain imagevalidatingpolicy.spec shows, among others, matchImageReferences and attestors (the public key(s) or the keyless identity).

Solution

At its core, an ImageValidatingPolicy needs: which image references are checked (matchImageReferences), against which trust anchor (attestors – a cosign public key or a keyless identity with issuer/subject), and the statement that the signature must be valid. The complete, tested setup with your own registry and cosign key is in the course “Kyverno & NetworkPolicies hands-on” (day “Verifying Images”).

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Enterprise Note

  • Image guardrails cluster-wide (not just one namespace): allowed registries, no :latest, ideally pinning to a digest (@sha256:…).
  • Signatures mandatory (ImageValidatingPolicy + cosign), ideally keyless via a Sigstore identity of your own CI.
  • Scan images before admitting them (Trivy/Grype) and run your own registry (Harbor) with signatures, SBOM, and retention.
  • Roll out policies in Audit mode first, collect violations, then switch to Deny – see Day 12.