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Hands-on IT IT Drills

Day 12: Admission Gaps and Policy Bypasses

Goal: You find two gaps in a “finished” policy – audit mode and too narrow a scope – and close both. · Duration: approx. 70 min · Prerequisite: Day 11

Briefing

Having a policy does not mean being protected. The two most common fallacies: the policy runs in Audit mode (it reports, but does not block), and it covers only part of the cluster (another namespace bypasses it). Today you build a “no-privileged” policy with exactly these gaps, demonstrate the bypass, and seal it.

Drill 1: The gap – policy in audit mode

kubectl create namespace gaps

kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1
kind: ValidatingPolicy
metadata: {name: no-privileged}
spec:
  validationActions: ["Audit"]
  matchConstraints:
    resourceRules:
    - apiGroups: [""]
      apiVersions: ["v1"]
      operations: ["CREATE"]
      resources: ["pods"]
  matchConditions:
  - name: only-gaps
    expression: "request.namespace == 'gaps'"
  validations:
  - expression: "object.spec.containers.all(c, !has(c.securityContext) ||
      !has(c.securityContext.privileged) || c.securityContext.privileged == false)"
    message: "privileged ist verboten"
EOF

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Drill 2: Exploit – Audit does not block

kubectl -n gaps run p --image=docker.io/library/busybox:1.36 --privileged \
  --command -- sleep infinity
kubectl -n gaps get pod p -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}'; echo

Expected: Pending/Running – the privileged Pod runs. Audit only writes a PolicyReport; admission lets it through. Remove it:

kubectl -n gaps delete pod p

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Drill 3: Fix 1 – switch to Deny

Change validationActions to Deny (rest of the policy identical):

kubectl patch validatingpolicy no-privileged --type=json \
  -p='[{"op":"replace","path":"/spec/validationActions","value":["Deny"]}]'

Proof in gaps:

kubectl -n gaps run p --image=docker.io/library/busybox:1.36 --privileged \
  --command -- sleep infinity

Expected:

Error from server: admission webhook "vpol.validate.kyverno.svc-...-no-privileged"
denied the request: Policy no-privileged failed: privileged ist verboten

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Drill 4: The second gap – too narrow a scope

The policy applies only to gaps. Every other namespace is open:

kubectl create namespace gaps2
kubectl -n gaps2 run p --image=docker.io/library/busybox:1.36 --privileged \
  --command -- sleep infinity
kubectl -n gaps2 get pod p -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}'; echo

Expected: Pending/Running – the same privileged Pod, just one namespace over, and the “protection” does not kick in. This is exactly how an attacker bypasses namespace-bound policies: they simply create resources in a namespace that is not covered.

kubectl -n gaps2 delete pod p

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Drill 5: Fix 2 – cluster-wide, excluding only system namespaces

Instead of including one namespace, you exclude the few trusted system namespaces and cover the rest:

kubectl patch validatingpolicy no-privileged --type=json -p='[{"op":"replace",
  "path":"/spec/matchConditions","value":[{"name":"not-system",
  "expression":"!(request.namespace in [\"kube-system\",\"kube-public\",\"kube-node-lease\",\"kyverno\"])"}]}]'

Proof – privileged is now rejected everywhere:

kubectl -n gaps2 run p --image=docker.io/library/busybox:1.36 --privileged \
  --command -- sleep infinity
kubectl -n attacker run pv --image=docker.io/library/busybox:1.36 --privileged \
  --command -- sleep infinity

Expected (both):

Error from server: admission webhook "..." denied the request:
Policy no-privileged failed: privileged ist verboten

Clean up:

kubectl delete validatingpolicy no-privileged
kubectl delete namespace gaps gaps2

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Checkpoint

After re-applying the final policy (Deny + not-system), there is no uncovered namespace left to find – test any new one:

kubectl create namespace gaps3
kubectl -n gaps3 run p --image=docker.io/library/busybox:1.36 --privileged \
  --command -- sleep infinity 2>&1 | grep -o "privileged ist verboten"
kubectl delete namespace gaps3

Expected: privileged ist verboten

Challenge

There is a third, subtle gap: the policy only matches operations: ["CREATE"]. Could an attacker create an allowed resource and escalate it via UPDATE? Check for Pods whether securityContext.privileged can be changed afterwards – and what that means for the choice of operations.

Hint: Try to set a running, compliant Pod to privileged: true with kubectl patch.

Solution

kubectl create namespace gaps4
kubectl -n gaps4 run q --image=docker.io/library/busybox:1.36 --command -- sleep infinity
kubectl -n gaps4 patch pod q --type=json \
  -p='[{"op":"add","path":"/spec/containers/0/securityContext","value":{"privileged":true}}]'
kubectl delete namespace gaps4

Expected: Kubernetes itself rejects the patch – the Pod securityContext is largely immutable after creation (Forbidden: pod updates may not change fields other than …). For Pods, this immutability saves you. For resources that can be changed (Deployments, many CRDs), you must always include UPDATE – otherwise the later patch is the gap.

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Enterprise Note

  • Policies through their lifecycle: first Audit, review violations (PolicyReports), then Deny – but the end state of production guardrails is always Deny.
  • Scope by exclusion (system namespaces) instead of inclusion; new namespaces are then covered automatically.
  • Complete operations: CREATE and UPDATE (and CONNECT where needed).
  • Consider Kyverno availability: if the webhook fails, failurePolicy decides whether to “reject when in doubt” (Fail, safe) or “let through” (Ignore). For security policies use Fail – for operations and HA, see the course “Kyverno & NetworkPolicies”.
  • Evaluate PolicyReports centrally (Policy Reporter) and alert on new violations.