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Hands-on IT IT Drills

Day 13: Case Study CVE-2020-8554 – externalIPs MITM

Goal: You understand a CVE that no version “fixes”, and close it with an admission policy. · Duration: approx. 55 min · Prerequisite: Day 12

Briefing

CVE-2020-8554 is special because no patch in the code fixes it: anyone allowed to create Services can use spec.externalIPs (or the status IP of a LoadBalancer) to redirect arbitrary IP addresses to themselves – including those of services outside the cluster. That is a man-in-the-middle for cluster traffic. The official mitigation is exactly what you learned on Day 11/12: an admission webhook that forbids externalIPs.

Drill 1: Affected? – understanding the mechanics

The “vulnerability” is a legitimate API field. Create a Service with externalIPs – it is accepted:

kubectl create namespace cve

kubectl -n cve apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata: {name: hijack, namespace: cve}
spec:
  externalIPs: ["172.16.0.50"]
  ports: [{port: 80, targetPort: 80}]
  selector: {app: nothing}
EOF
kubectl -n cve get svc hijack -o jsonpath='{.spec.externalIPs[0]}'; echo

Expected:

172.16.0.50

Why dangerous? 172.16.0.50 can be the IP of someone else’s service. The kube-proxy on every node now pulls this traffic onto this Service – the attacker reads or modifies it. Anyone with create services can do this, cluster-wide.

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Drill 2: Mitigation – forbid externalIPs

kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1
kind: ValidatingPolicy
metadata: {name: no-external-ips}
spec:
  validationActions: ["Deny"]
  matchConstraints:
    resourceRules:
    - apiGroups: [""]
      apiVersions: ["v1"]
      operations: ["CREATE","UPDATE"]
      resources: ["services"]
  validations:
  - expression: "!has(object.spec.externalIPs) || size(object.spec.externalIPs) == 0"
    message: "Service.spec.externalIPs ist verboten (CVE-2020-8554)"
EOF

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Drill 3: Proof – the redirecting Service is rejected

kubectl -n cve delete svc hijack
kubectl -n cve apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata: {name: hijack2, namespace: cve}
spec:
  externalIPs: ["172.16.0.50"]
  ports: [{port: 80, targetPort: 80}]
  selector: {app: nothing}
EOF

Expected:

Warning: spec.externalIPs is deprecated and may no longer be implemented in some clusters
Error from server: error when creating "STDIN": admission webhook "vpol.validate.kyverno.svc-fail"
denied the request: Policy no-external-ips failed: Service.spec.externalIPs ist verboten
(CVE-2020-8554)

Tip: The deprecation warning shows that newer Kubernetes versions are pushing back on externalIPs anyway – but do not rely on that; forbid it actively.

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Drill 4: Proof – normal Services keep working

kubectl -n cve create deployment web --image=nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:stable
kubectl -n cve expose deployment web --port=80
kubectl -n cve get svc web -o jsonpath='{.spec.type}'; echo

Expected:

ClusterIP

Clean up:

kubectl delete validatingpolicy no-external-ips
kubectl delete namespace cve

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Checkpoint

Without the policy, the cluster accepts externalIPs – with the policy, it does not. Check that currently no Service in the cluster carries externalIPs:

kubectl get svc -A -o json | python3 -c '
import sys,json
hit=False
for s in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"]:
    eip=s["spec"].get("externalIPs")
    if eip:
        print(s["metadata"]["namespace"]+"/"+s["metadata"]["name"], eip); hit=True
print("keiner" if not hit else "BEFUND")'

Expected: keiner

Challenge

CVE-2020-8554 also affects the status.loadBalancer IP. Think about why a pure spec.externalIPs policy is not enough when a LoadBalancer controller runs in the cluster – and where the additional boundary lies.

Hint: The status IP is set by the LoadBalancer controller, not by the user; the lever is who may change services/status.

Solution

The LoadBalancer status IP is not set via spec, but via the services/status subresource – an externalIPs policy does not apply there. The boundary is RBAC: only the LoadBalancer controller may have update/patch on services/status, no workload and no user. Check this as on Day 2: kubectl auth can-i update services/status --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker:default (Expected: no).

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Enterprise Note

  • Forbid externalIPs cluster-wide via policy; if a service genuinely needs them, restrict them tightly via an allowlist to fixed, verified IPs.
  • Allow services/status only to the LoadBalancer controller.
  • CVEs without a code fix (design CVEs) keep coming up – the defense is almost always admission policy plus RBAC. Your Kyverno setup thus becomes part of the patch process.
  • For third-party CVEs, subscribe to the official Kubernetes security announcements (kubernetes-announce) and keep policies ready as a response.